Types of ethical systems
May 12th 2007 12:03
* What happens if you classify Godless ethical systems by "epistemology" -- that is, by the main knowledge tool they use (assuming there's a main one)?
* Such a tool might serve one or both of two functions: (1) to legitimize the system; and/or (2) to generate solutions to ethical problems.
* Here's a very very rough categorisation, a couple of examples, and some brief notes. I don't pretend that all, or even any, secular ethical system will fit neatly into this scheme, but I think it's one way to get a conceptual grip.
Fact/nature
* The old religious morality was in a sense separated from questions of happiness. Right and wrong didn't need to have anything to do with earthly well-being -- and, in fact, could easily be at odds with it. The self-denial strand of Christianity culminates in the missionary, the monk, the hairshirt, whip and cilice, the Simeon-Stylites-style ascetic, the martyr.
* But various people have argued for a connection between morality and earthly happiness. For instance, even if you do believe in an afterlife, the claim might be that what's wrong on earth is what causes earthly bad, and what's right on earth is what causes earthly good.
* How to tell the good and the bad? -- Well, it boils down to beliefs about human nature, perhaps with a reliance on observation.
* You might wind up with what Derek Parfit calls an "objective list". For instance, John Finnis (Natural law and natural rights, 1980) believes in multiple intrinsic goods: life; knowledge; play; aesthetic experience; sociability or friendship; practical reasonableness; and religion.
Consciousness
* Most people could probably be persuaded that we have instincts towards sociability (as well as instincts towards murder). Evolution seems a good explanatory starting point for the origin of ethics.
* But what if social instincts were something that we couldn't not deal with, that we couldn't avoid?
* Emmanuel Levinas puts up a complex argument (I don't pretend to understand it, nor to claim that it works) to something like the effect that ethics comes before metaphysics. Says Levinas, we ask "By what right" prior to asking "What". As soon as we have self-awareness, as soon as we have a self, there's already an "other" (a not-self) that makes demands on us. For we only gain a self under the gaze of the other.
Reason
* So Kant famously believes (or so goes the official story) that ethics can be derived from pure reason -- that if you just think about it, you're compelled to accept certain codes of conduct.
* One basic reason to be skeptical is that it's persuasive (or I think so anyway) that rationality is concerned with means, not ends -- that it can't function by itself -- you need extra-rational premises to plug into the reasoning machine -- there's no such thing as pure reason.
* Spinoza allegedly derives his system from pure reason, but perhaps differs from Kant in providing an account of human nature. Kant spurns human nature talk, as well as the whole "fact" tradition. Any morality based on this accidental, alterable, altering thing called human nature doesn't deserve the name.
* Habermas' "discourse ethics", from the very litle I understand of it, puts discussion at the centre of ethics, and is therefore concerned with fair discussion and such things as the ability of all interested parties to have their say. Presumably, it's partly on this basis that he criticizes American action in Iraq -- America contravened the wishes of the United Nations, removed itself from the sphere of discussion and group consensus, set a bad precedent.
* If John Rawls (A theory of justice, 1971) is to be understood as a contract ethicist, his agreement is ideal rather than actual. The basis for ethics, on this view, isn't what people do agree to, but what they would agree to, were they ideal reasoners in an ideal situation.
* Rorty, Dewey, Putnam are arguably understood as something akin to contract theorists.
* Didn't have a decent reference to hand, so here's a quote from an online paper about Habermas ("Towards a synthesis of discourse ethics and internet regulation" by P Duquenoy, H Thimbleby, and S Torrance):
Intuitions
* What if reason led to a conclusion like "It's never okay to lie -- even to the Gestapo"? Or what if the United Nations sanctioned slavery?
* Now, these things (the latter anyway) might conflict with your everyday beliefs. But what basis would you have for mounting a counter-argument? You couldn't simply say, "I don't believe in slavery -- and I'm obviously right. Period." To say such would be to quit the game completely -- the game, that is, of giving good reasons, providing justifications, etc. For it's also assumed, in this game, that you don't have any privileged authority. Something isn't right simply because it's you who says it.
* And let's assume that you can appeal neither to God, nor to queer laws (and "human rights" are quite queer, if they're considered part of the fabric of the universe and not created by human legal systems).
* Well, some people think they can still appeal to feelings, "moral sense", "intuition". If an argument leads to a conclusion like the permissibility of slavery, then that in itself is a "reductio ad absurdum", a demonstration of contradiction. -- Normative ethics, on this view, has to meet the test of intuitions.
* Intuitions allow an escape from the prison of "This is simply what I think". Because it's more than a simply. You add a clause. You're still playing the discussion game. "This is what I think, and don't you feel the same way too?" And if you do, then perhaps I've persuaded you; and if you don't, then I haven't.
* On the intuitions view, a lot of the business of ethics is constructing hypotheticals, making them vivid, and seeing what your intuitions tell you, or seeing what does or doesn't match them. You might then try to work out why your intuitions are telling you this -- that is, what the morally relevant features are that you're picking up on, what the underlying logic is, why your intuitions are pushed to react one way rather than another. And so you can use intuitions to answer particular problems; -- or, by examining the underlying logic, you can try, with John Rawls, to construct a whole system that can guide you even when your basic intuitions don't.
* Many of the other systems (fact, consciousness, contract, even reason) will use intuitions in some capacity. For instance, the "fact" approach will rely on introspection as well as observation to determine human good.
* More on intuitions in the next next post.
Existentialism
* The existentialist believes that there's no reason to take account of what human good is alleged to be (you can always change "human nature" anyway); that reason doesn't compel to anything -- one can always choose to be irrational; that there's no reason to abide by intuitions; and that that there's no reason to take account of the sort of respect for others that seems to form part of the basis of a contract view.
* What are you left with? -- Well, you simply make a choice, without pretending to yourself that there's any ground for that decision.
* And you can't shirk the responsibility. Not choosing is still choosing.
* And you can't shirk the responsibility for the consequences of your acts and omissions. In a sense, there's no one out there but you.
A final thought
* I've characterized these approaches in terms of "main epistemological tool". And I mentioned that one function of such a tool is to generate ethical solutions. For instance, to find the answer to a particular dilemma, Aristotle might go to ask experts in the relevant virtue, Kant will sit in his armchair and contemplate, Habermas will form a discussion group, etc.
* But the other, related function of epistemological tools is legitimation. And people have a sort of top-down notion here. For most things in life, you can ask what empowers it. So Jack Bauer gets his authority from the Counter Terrorist Unit, the CTU is empowered by a statute, the statute was voted in by the government... And following this game, we want there to be a starting point, a Big Bang of authority. The game of giving reasons is the children's why game, and we want there to be an end to all whys.
* But if you tried to set out an argument for any moral claim, you'd get to some principle (or a number of principles) like "One should use reason", "Intuitions are trustworthy", "Other people's viewpoints should be respected", etc. And if it's fair to characterize the argument structure thusly, then what is the basis of these values, these foundational epistemological moves? And how does one decide between them? Are they self-justifying? Or are they arbitrary (and is one condemned to be existentialist about epistemic values as well as ethical ones)?
* Well, maybe no chain of reasons terminates in a reason. If there's an origin point, perhaps it's something like a biological necessity.
* And it may well be that the differing ethical systems are to be understood in terms of differing necessities, or differing interpretations of a single necessity.
This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia articles Sheryl Crow, Emmanuel Levinas. The Jurgen Habermas image came from this site. The greyhound came from this website. The image of Jack Bauer came from this website. The image of Jean-Paul Sartre came from this website.
* Such a tool might serve one or both of two functions: (1) to legitimize the system; and/or (2) to generate solutions to ethical problems.
* Here's a very very rough categorisation, a couple of examples, and some brief notes. I don't pretend that all, or even any, secular ethical system will fit neatly into this scheme, but I think it's one way to get a conceptual grip.
***
Fact/nature
* The old religious morality was in a sense separated from questions of happiness. Right and wrong didn't need to have anything to do with earthly well-being -- and, in fact, could easily be at odds with it. The self-denial strand of Christianity culminates in the missionary, the monk, the hairshirt, whip and cilice, the Simeon-Stylites-style ascetic, the martyr.
'If it makes you happy... it can't be that bad... if it makes you happy... then why the hell are you so sad?'
* How to tell the good and the bad? -- Well, it boils down to beliefs about human nature, perhaps with a reliance on observation.
* You might wind up with what Derek Parfit calls an "objective list". For instance, John Finnis (Natural law and natural rights, 1980) believes in multiple intrinsic goods: life; knowledge; play; aesthetic experience; sociability or friendship; practical reasonableness; and religion.
* Aristotle (384-322BC) in the Nicomachean ethics makes claims about the human function:
| "[P]resumably the remark that the best good is happiness is apparently something [generally] agreed, and we still need a clearer idea of what the best good is. Perhaps, then, we shall find this if we first grasp the function of a human being... What, then, could this be? For living is apparently shared with plants, but what we are looking for us the special function of a human being; hence we should set aside the life of nutrition and growth. The life next in order is some sort of life of sense perception; but this too is apparently shared with horse, ox, and every animal. The remaining possibility, then, is some sort of life of action of the [part of the soul] that has reason... We have found, then, that the human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason... Now each function is completed well by being completed in accord with the virtue proper [to that kind of thing]. And so the human good proves to be the activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one." |
* And compare John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism, 1861):
| "Unquestionably it is possible to do without happiness; it is done involuntarily by nineteen-twentieths of mankind, even in those parts of our present world which are least deep in barbarism; and it often has to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which he prizes more than his individual happiness. But this something, what is it, unless the happiness of others or some of the requisites of happiness?" |
Consciousness
* Most people could probably be persuaded that we have instincts towards sociability (as well as instincts towards murder). Evolution seems a good explanatory starting point for the origin of ethics.
* But what if social instincts were something that we couldn't not deal with, that we couldn't avoid?
* Emmanuel Levinas, "Substitution" (1967):
| "Must we not speak of a responsibility that is not assumed?... Responsibility to the other does not wait for the freedom of commitment to the other. Without ever having done anything, I have always been under accusation: I am persecuted... In its passivity without the arche of identity, ipseity is a hostage. The word 'I' means to be answerable for everything and for everyone." |
Reason
* So Kant famously believes (or so goes the official story) that ethics can be derived from pure reason -- that if you just think about it, you're compelled to accept certain codes of conduct.
* One basic reason to be skeptical is that it's persuasive (or I think so anyway) that rationality is concerned with means, not ends -- that it can't function by itself -- you need extra-rational premises to plug into the reasoning machine -- there's no such thing as pure reason.
* Spinoza allegedly derives his system from pure reason, but perhaps differs from Kant in providing an account of human nature. Kant spurns human nature talk, as well as the whole "fact" tradition. Any morality based on this accidental, alterable, altering thing called human nature doesn't deserve the name.
* Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (1785):
| "Empirical principles are not at all fit to be the ground of moral laws. For, the universality with which these are to hold for all rational beings without distinction... comes to nothing if their ground is taken from the special constitution of human nature or the contingent circumstances in which it is placed. The principle of one's own happiness, however, is the most objectionable, not merely because it is false and experience contradicts the pretense that well-being always proportions itself to good conduct, nor yet merely because it contributes nothing at all to the establishment of morality, since making someone happy is quite different from making him good... it is the more objectionable because it bases morality on incentives that undermine it and destroy all its sublimity, since they put motives to virtue and those to vice in one class and only teach us to calculate better, but quite obliterate the specific differences between virtue and vice." |
* Note also: With Kant, you might get consequences that diverge quite a bit from ordinary moral beliefs. Once you radicalize the starting point, then everything lies open to question. Once you convert to a different religion, or lose a religion, everything lies open to question. You can no longer blithely accept that most, or even any, of your previous everyday beliefs and practices are correct.
Agreement/contract
* When you're speaking descriptively (rather than normatively), how do you work out what are the morals of a society? What are the moral beliefs of that tribe, or this epoch, etc.
* Well, there's a sense in which you look to the majority. If most of a society has a taboo against killing, then you can conclude that, in that society, it's immoral to kill. -- Although, okay, the story is impossibly more complex than this (including issues to do with defining what "moral" means to begin with).
* The contract theorist moves from the descriptive to the normative. One version of what I'm calling a "contract" approach is to take a majority not only as what does happen, but as what should happen. Or to put the claim a little stronger: that there's no other basis for working out right and wrong. We all have differing desires and beliefs, and there's no independent arbitrator, no authority we can appeal to.
* If not a simple majority (a head count and sheer weight of numbers), then some other arrangement that's just.
* If John Rawls (A theory of justice, 1971) is to be understood as a contract ethicist, his agreement is ideal rather than actual. The basis for ethics, on this view, isn't what people do agree to, but what they would agree to, were they ideal reasoners in an ideal situation.
* Rorty, Dewey, Putnam are arguably understood as something akin to contract theorists.
* Didn't have a decent reference to hand, so here's a quote from an online paper about Habermas ("Towards a synthesis of discourse ethics and internet regulation" by P Duquenoy, H Thimbleby, and S Torrance):
| "Jurgen Habermas (1983) [Moral consciousness and communicative action]... uses rationality as the universal underpinning for arriving at legitimate ethical norms. Habermas -- by using communication in the form of argumentation -- actively involves others in a dynamic way thus bringing a more explicit social element to the ethical domain.... On this view moral judgements are ideally arrived at through a joint endeavour to achieve understanding, instead of by individual reflection based on an assumption of mutual understanding (which, according to Habermas, is the position taken by Kant). The resulting ethical positions are not static and fixed, but are dynamic and grounded in the social world. Their legitimacy comes from this grounding, expressed as a consensus of the participants. The process of (valid) argumentation, by its critical nature, tests the validity of claims (in the same way scientific argument tests validity) and by this process has the capacity to identify and correct mistakes. In other words, a learning process is opened up." |
Intuitions
* What if reason led to a conclusion like "It's never okay to lie -- even to the Gestapo"? Or what if the United Nations sanctioned slavery?
* Now, these things (the latter anyway) might conflict with your everyday beliefs. But what basis would you have for mounting a counter-argument? You couldn't simply say, "I don't believe in slavery -- and I'm obviously right. Period." To say such would be to quit the game completely -- the game, that is, of giving good reasons, providing justifications, etc. For it's also assumed, in this game, that you don't have any privileged authority. Something isn't right simply because it's you who says it.
* And let's assume that you can appeal neither to God, nor to queer laws (and "human rights" are quite queer, if they're considered part of the fabric of the universe and not created by human legal systems).
Don't you have sympathy for this poor, abused animal?
* Intuitions allow an escape from the prison of "This is simply what I think". Because it's more than a simply. You add a clause. You're still playing the discussion game. "This is what I think, and don't you feel the same way too?" And if you do, then perhaps I've persuaded you; and if you don't, then I haven't.
* On the intuitions view, a lot of the business of ethics is constructing hypotheticals, making them vivid, and seeing what your intuitions tell you, or seeing what does or doesn't match them. You might then try to work out why your intuitions are telling you this -- that is, what the morally relevant features are that you're picking up on, what the underlying logic is, why your intuitions are pushed to react one way rather than another. And so you can use intuitions to answer particular problems; -- or, by examining the underlying logic, you can try, with John Rawls, to construct a whole system that can guide you even when your basic intuitions don't.
* Many of the other systems (fact, consciousness, contract, even reason) will use intuitions in some capacity. For instance, the "fact" approach will rely on introspection as well as observation to determine human good.
* More on intuitions in the next next post.
Existentialism
* What are you left with? -- Well, you simply make a choice, without pretending to yourself that there's any ground for that decision.
* And you can't shirk the responsibility. Not choosing is still choosing.
* And you can't shirk the responsibility for the consequences of your acts and omissions. In a sense, there's no one out there but you.
* Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a humanism" (1946):
| "... if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism -- man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if god does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behavior. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free... I can neither seek within myself for an authentic impulse to action, nor can I expect, from some ethic, formulae that will enable me to act". |
* Simone de Beauvoir, The ethics of ambiguity (1948):
| "One does not offer an ethics to a God. It is impossible to propose any to man if one defines him as nature, as something given. The so-called psychological or empirical ethics manage to establish themselves only by introducing surreptitiously some flaw within the manthing which they have first defined. Hegel tells us in the last part of The Phenomenology of Mind that moral consciousness can exist only to the extent that there is disagreement between nature and morality. It would disappear if the ethical law became the natural law... However, far from God's absence authorizing all license, the contrary is the case, because man is abandoned on the earth, because his acts are definitive, absolute engagements. He bears the responsibility for a world which is not the work of a strange power, but of himself, where his defeats are inscribed, and his victories as well. A God can pardon, efface, and compensate. But if God does not exist, man's faults are inexpiable." |
***
A final thought
* I've characterized these approaches in terms of "main epistemological tool". And I mentioned that one function of such a tool is to generate ethical solutions. For instance, to find the answer to a particular dilemma, Aristotle might go to ask experts in the relevant virtue, Kant will sit in his armchair and contemplate, Habermas will form a discussion group, etc.
* But if you tried to set out an argument for any moral claim, you'd get to some principle (or a number of principles) like "One should use reason", "Intuitions are trustworthy", "Other people's viewpoints should be respected", etc. And if it's fair to characterize the argument structure thusly, then what is the basis of these values, these foundational epistemological moves? And how does one decide between them? Are they self-justifying? Or are they arbitrary (and is one condemned to be existentialist about epistemic values as well as ethical ones)?
* Well, maybe no chain of reasons terminates in a reason. If there's an origin point, perhaps it's something like a biological necessity.
* And it may well be that the differing ethical systems are to be understood in terms of differing necessities, or differing interpretations of a single necessity.
* From Wittgenstein's lecture on ethics (published in Philosophical Review, 74(1), January 1965):
| "My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolutely valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it." |
* From Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations (first published 1953):
| -- 211: "... my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons." -- 325: "... 'The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction.' Does that mean that I argue to myself: 'Fire has always burned me, so it will happen now too?' Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its ground?... What people accept as a justification -- is shewn by how they think and live." -- 326: "We expect this, and are surprised at that. But the chain of reasons has an end." |
***
This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia articles Sheryl Crow, Emmanuel Levinas. The Jurgen Habermas image came from this site. The greyhound came from this website. The image of Jack Bauer came from this website. The image of Jean-Paul Sartre came from this website.
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Comment by Uula Limanski
Thinking The World
And creating a system based on rules determined by society is still quite vague, since you can get anywhere if moved by this.
Pure reason won't achieve any rules without experience. But it is not either from experiences that you can find any laws. Laws come from the application of "concepts", learned from things we see. But there is a difference between a "fact" you see, and a "concept" you develop. And from these "concepts" you can use reason to get to laws. But it's impossible to get to any law by simple experimentation without reasoning.
Concerning the existentialist, whenever he makes a choice, he'll have a new fact in mind, a new "concept" developped. Completing all facts in his life and things he've learned, can't he create nothing from his "concepts"? With these "concepts" can't he validade rules people tell him? In this validation process he would be using "concepts", not "facts", and thus using reason.
For sure these "concepts" can be different for each one when they do not have access to the same quantities of information (of facts). Like when you say
They would be more fragile to be pushed into persuasion. But the more access to facts this person have, the harder it will be to persuade the guy.
So you have a tendency that, the more facts you have, the better you'll be able to reason and see what works and what does not work. Pushing the thing to infinity, you would be able to get to "universal rules" that should apply. But of course, doing this we shall fall inevitably into an illusion...
hehe. i'll be reading your next posts to see where it gets. cheers! Uula
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Well... In a very basic sense, everyone uses some sort of generalizations about human nature in their ethical behaviour. For instance, I generally believe that people don't want to be punched, and that punching calls pain. There are bound to be lots of people out there who love being punched, or whom punching doesn't cause pain. But when I make an ethical decision, to punch you or not to punch, don't I have to make it on the basis of probabilistic judgments about human nature...?
It's true that you can get anywhere -- the society could potentially decide anything whatsoever. And what it decides will vary over time. But it seems to me you're implying that it's a bad thing that you could get anywhere.
The contract ethicist might reply: "On what basis do you think it's a bad thing?" -- Bear in mind that the contract ethicist doesn't believe in an "objective" right and wrong. So they might say that there is no standard to compare against. There is nothing outside rational discussion to decide what moral rules a society should follow. And there's nothing inherently wrong with ethical rules that change over time.
Comment by Damo
There is nothing like a few visiting Nazis to refocus how I look at the world.
With no ditrespect toward the learned gentle men you are quoting, I think the horse is being put before the cart by many people.
I am not comfortable with being vague about the difference between Morals, Ethics, Customs and Behaviours. Do we ever ask what is morality and how is it different than a custom? Following the logic of ethics as long as the system is consistent and adheres to its own rules it is valid. Meaning a Nazi is completely ethical as long as he is a good Nazi. Morally it is a different matter.
Each of those things must be able to be tested to show their validity. That is, there must be a reason for them to be classed as such.
Just using morality as an example
From what I can see all morality has its roots in the ideology that a person subscribes to.
Using pure reason is rationalism.
Using pure empathy is emotionalism
The list is endless but the final result is the same thing.
Ideologies (I include theologies here too) are things that people subscribe to. There are the all world view that people use as the touch stone to look for the hard answers. How to live and what is right and wrong about stealing, killing, etc.
So I would have to say that trying to disect and examine ethics and morality seperate from ideology either impossible or it is self delusional. You will be examining an ideology from an ideological position.
Just my attempt to add more confusion into the issue.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Okay, I think we need to discuss this one more for me to grasp where you're coming from. There's a lot of things I don't understand. But, to cut to one key point:
From this I get the impression that you're using the words "ethics" and "morals" in this way:
"ethics" = any consistent code of conduct
"morals"/"morality" = the correct code of conduct
Okay, using the words in this way, one follow-up question:
-- How do you know the Nazis were immoral? What is your method of working out that their ethics was incorrect?
For instance, is it? -- Because they did things that were counter to God or human rights (divine command theory or queer laws), because they did things that no human feelings could possibly agree with (intuitionism), because they did things that obviously led to bad consequences (empirical approach), or because they didn't play fair, and used rules that not everyone could consistently follow (Kantian approach)?
What I want to suggest is that when you declare the Nazis immoral, you're using one, or a mixture, of these methods to work out that they were wrong -- AND that, if this is true, then you can't accuse the ethicists quoted above of putting things in the wrong order, putting the cart before the horse -- if you're also putting things in this order and are using the same methods to work out what's moral.
Comment by Damo
I will try to limit my words so that I don't go off on tangents.
I put ethics and ethical structures in to the 'Point of View, basket.
Both morality and ethics beg the question= Whose morality, whose ethics?
I can construct an ethical system that rejects all morality.
Morality only tests only one question: Is something good or evil?
Everything negative beyond that fall into the consequences of the morality test.
So I put to you that a person must have subscribed to an ideology that has constructed a system of 'good verses evil' before they can suscribe to any morality.
I can go further and say that not every nazi is evil because not every nazi did evil. Yet if I am asked to say whether Nazism is evil then I could answer only in relation to the morality that I subscribe to. Objectively I may be correct but due to the nature of rhetoric it can be argued both ways and appear reasonable.
Is Music Evil?
Puritan answer: Yes, it is conflicts with the morality that I subscribe to.
Non-Puritan Answer? No, It isn't even a moral question.
Grouping of assumptions about good and evil also muddy the waters.
Why Nazism Evil?
A1: Because its key principles are diametrically opposed to the morality that I subscribe to.
A2: Because it is filled with errors about human beings and human nature.
A3: Because we know where it will lead.
A4: Because it is my national enemy in war.
Not all these answers have strict moral overtones, rather some deal with consequences,' others with partisan loyalties and others with logical inconsistencies. Only A1 directly relates to morality.
I think I have babbled on enough.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Okay, I'm starting to see where you're coming from. You're using "ethics" to mean any system of conduct, and "morality" to mean conduct to do with good and evil. And by "ideology" presumably you mean any belief system. And if all this is correct, then I'd agree with you (who wouldn't?) that in order for "conduct to do with good and evil" to be a practical idea, you first need to believe in good and evil. And you're also clearly correct that it's possible to construct a system of conduct that doesn't use the concepts of good and evil (so, for instance, human rights talk doesn't use "evil" but "rights violation"; and utilitarianism doesn't use "good" but "happiness", etc).
So, going back to your original comment:
Well, I don't know if this will address your concerns, but here's two points in reply.
Firstly, isn't it still possible for me to discuss Islamic theology even if I'm not Muslim? And couldn't I discuss the problem of ethics without God even if I were not an atheist? So I'm unsure of the exact sense in which you mean "impossible" or "self-delusional".
Secondly, I'd suggest that I could explain to you enough of the ideology that the ethics come for you to be able to appreciate what problem gives rise to them.
The main problem, I suppose, is that they don't accept a concept of good and evil. Or, at any rate, they don't treat good and evil as supernatural forces engaged in cosmic conflict, or non-material things hiding inside physical things.
I'd basically agree with you that one is never standing outside an ideology, a belief system. But I'd also want to claim that this doesn't mean that inquiring into other belief systems is a pointless task, if this is what you're suggesting. For instance, it's often the case that two different systems share enough common ground for each to be useful to the other.
Comment by Damo
I guess what I was trying say is that no matter how noble our intention are we are still blinded to some degree by our own prejudices. So even if I examine an alien theology I do so using some of my personal notions as a yard stick for comparison. I can examine an ideology, compare it to what I know and if there is a conflict I make a choice. Stick with my existing ideology as a yardstick or adopt the new ideology.
So I totally agree with you that examining another ideology is a worthwhile exercise, even if you come to the conclusion that it is unsuitable. At least you will know what you disagree with and why.
Comment by pernethique.ch
May I propose you a different ethical system ?
How about an ethical system based on the 4 forces that have shaped the universe including the earth and its beautiful cities, inhabitants, mountains, lakes, animals etc ?
I am refering to the gravity, the strong and the weak interaction, the electromagnetism. These forces are described by symmetries and this symmetries contain ethical values if you look at them closely:
Right/left symmetry = principle of equality
Mirror symmetry = principle of reciprocity, truth (as mirror of reality)
Scale symmetry = principle of proportionnality
Time symmetry = principle of responsibility and sustainability.
For more details see : www.pernethique.ch
With my best regards
J.J. Pernet
Comment by Anonymous
I just always wondered this about Kantianism...
"Can reason be the basis of a sucessful ethical system?"
If someone does kindly answer this question, please don't use too many philosophical words! as i said, i really dont have much knowledge at the table of Ethics!
thanks!
Comment by Nonymous
Philosophy Blog
However, the idea that it's possible to create a meaningful ethical system from reason alone is unpopular. Even in Kant's time, one of the common criticisms of his ideas was that it was empty of content and merely amounted to the idea that an ethical system should be non-contradictory.
What is reason? Something to do with logic, let's say (though it's more than this). But what can logic tell you about anything by itself? Logic only says when an argument is valid or invalid. Eg if Socrates is a man, and if all men are mortal, then Socrates is mortal. But logic can't tell you if it's true that Socrates is a man, or if it's true that all men are mortal.
In the same way, it's thought that you need more than reason alone to create an ethics. The values and beliefs you start reasoning with come from outside reason alone.
Comment by Anonymous
It just seems to me Kant slightly contradicts himself by placing huge importance on human reason, however his ideas come from Duty and Good Will?
Is it like Catholicism where they have rules and are deontological although they encourage individuals in using apologetics to see that they were morally correct in what they taught?
(I dont mean to press an answer of anyone, however I've got both my AS-level ethics modules on Monday and need to understand a few details!!!)
Comment by Nonymous
Philosophy Blog
From distant memory, these terms occur in the Prolegomena and Kant says things like, "the only good thing is a good will".
What does he mean? Well, start with this thought -- actions in themselves might happen to have good consequences, or they might happen to have bad consequences. Kant doesn't believe therefore that actions are properly called good. What is good, rather, is the intention behind the action. So you might try to do good, and dramatically fail, but the bad consequences don't negate the goodness of the action -- your heart was still in the right place; your will was good.
I think "duty" is understood in a similar way --duty is simply that which you know you must do. It's an interesting feature of Kant's system that he tries to build in obligation to be moral, whereas many other systems don't do this -- they can tell you what it is to be moral, but they can't tell you why one should care in the first place about being moral. Kant argues something like this: he thinks of humans as essentially disembodied wills, somewhat like Descartes, and morality is what's required for a will not to work against and contradict itself.
This said, Kant does later go on to write extensively about virtue, and it's always been problematic how to reconcile later Kant with early Kant, which is on first sight sort of hyperconscious, hyperrational, and devoid of any moral feeling -- instead, one coldly sees what is right, and then does it.
Comment by Nonymous
Philosophy Blog
Comment by pernethique.ch
Reason can be and should be the basis for an improved ethical system. Old ethics are often based on outdated knowledges.
I am not a philosoph, less an ethicist but when building my proposal for a universal ethics based on symmetries I had in mind the fact symmetries describe real things and not ideal ones.
Lets go back to the above argument according which an action is good if well intended. Suppose a banker over-trades subprime securities or over-lends to Greece. His intentions are good, have no doubt about it. He believes his actions will generate profits, bonuses etc. yet his actions are disastrous because he failed to respect a fundamental ethical value: the proportionnality (which is based on scale symmetry)
Freedom is a value but a non-normative value.
Under freedom you can act positively or negatively. To channel your actions in the right direction you need normative values. These are provided by the symmetries and their ethical values which I have tried to describe in www.pernethique.ch.
I am not sure you will be satisfied with this comment, the best way is to search by oneself and remember it can take many years to achieve a full maturity. In meantime keep trying, experiencing and above all be reasonable and Human.
Regards
Jean-Jacques Pernet