Sport and love
December 18th 2009 21:48
There's a Seinfeld schtick that goes: "Following a sport team? I don't get it. The players change, the coaches change. All that stays the same is the t-shirts. So, basically, you're supporting a group of t-shirts." Etc. Etc.
Well, I've always thought there was a lot of truth here. But the problem isn't specific to sports. Yes, a "team" is a changing object, but so is every human being. Consider, for instance, the common thought (I don't know if it's true) that every cell in your body is replaced within seven years.
In virtue of what does something stay the same?
There are instincts, there is genetic makeup, but I'm tempted, as per usual, to say that the answer lies partly with language -- the preparedness of a linguistic community to conceptualize a thing as a thing, and to provide conditions under which that thing persists.
Of course, one might be skeptical whether those conditions are clear, precise and unchanging.
Is it irrational to support team x if team y is far more likely to win?
Depends, of course, on your motivations. Maybe you know the players personally and have ties of friendship. Maybe you get more of an emotional buzz out of the riskier bet. Maybe it appeals to you to barrack for the underdog -- the underdog is more deserving. Maybe you regard one team as morally superior to another.
But the issue is not so different from questions of love. If you love a person for particular qualities -- their kindness, their humour, their intelligence, their beauty -- then, logically speaking, you have no reason not to upgrade when a better deal comes along -- someone who's kinder, funnier, more intelligent, more beautiful...
And yet people often don't upgrade -- are they irrational?
Notes
-- Thursday 6 May 2010: Stumbled on this interesting article: Daniel Engber, "The Underdog Effect: Why do we love a loser?", Slate, Friday 30 April 2010. It offers various theories for why people support underdogs, including theories that try to explain underdog support as rational on a hedonistic calculus.
Well, I've always thought there was a lot of truth here. But the problem isn't specific to sports. Yes, a "team" is a changing object, but so is every human being. Consider, for instance, the common thought (I don't know if it's true) that every cell in your body is replaced within seven years.
In virtue of what does something stay the same?
There are instincts, there is genetic makeup, but I'm tempted, as per usual, to say that the answer lies partly with language -- the preparedness of a linguistic community to conceptualize a thing as a thing, and to provide conditions under which that thing persists.
Of course, one might be skeptical whether those conditions are clear, precise and unchanging.
***
Is it irrational to support team x if team y is far more likely to win?
Depends, of course, on your motivations. Maybe you know the players personally and have ties of friendship. Maybe you get more of an emotional buzz out of the riskier bet. Maybe it appeals to you to barrack for the underdog -- the underdog is more deserving. Maybe you regard one team as morally superior to another.
But the issue is not so different from questions of love. If you love a person for particular qualities -- their kindness, their humour, their intelligence, their beauty -- then, logically speaking, you have no reason not to upgrade when a better deal comes along -- someone who's kinder, funnier, more intelligent, more beautiful...
And yet people often don't upgrade -- are they irrational?
***
Notes
-- Thursday 6 May 2010: Stumbled on this interesting article: Daniel Engber, "The Underdog Effect: Why do we love a loser?", Slate, Friday 30 April 2010. It offers various theories for why people support underdogs, including theories that try to explain underdog support as rational on a hedonistic calculus.
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Comment by Nonymous
Philosophy Blog
Two quick thoughts.
Decisions and rationality
My wording is misleading. When I say, "And yet people often don't upgrade -- are they irrational?", I'm talking about decisions.
I mean, I'm asking whether the decision not to dump your partner is necessarily irrational.
What does it mean for a decision to be "rational" or "irrational"? I can't easily summarize what I think on the subject, but I can give an example: -- If there is an imperative to maximize apples, and there is a choice between one apple and two apples, and there are no other factors or constraints, the "rational" decision (as I understand the word) is to select two apples.
Would you agree that decisions (rather than people) can sometimes fairly be labelled rational?
People and rationality
But people (rather than decisions) can also be labelled rational and irrational. (And it seems that other things as well can be labelled rational and irrational -- one's reasons and motivations, for instance.)
I think the essence of what you're saying is that people don't always behave rationally. If I'm interpreting you correctly here, then I'd agree with you, and I'd consider this an uncontroversial claim.
But if you're going further, and saying that people are never rational ("Our rational faculty isn't used in decision making ... The real point is that rationality has nothing to do with our decisions about love or sports") -- if you're making this further claim, I do think it's very debatable.
Your comment again raises questions like: "What is rationality?", "What does it mean to be rational?", "Under what conditions is a person fairly labelled rational or irrational?", "Does a person have to be completely rational in order fairly to be labelled rational?"
Without attempting an answer to these, let me put it this way:
-- Surely people do make decisions (regardless of whether they have free will or not)?
-- Surely they sometimes reason in the course of making those decisions?
-- And surely that reasoning sometimes has an effect on the decisions?
If you would grant these points, then wouldn't you agree that rationality sometimes does have something to do with decision-making?
And if you'd agree that rationality sometimes does have something to do with decision-making, wouldn't you agree that people are sometimes rational?
Comment by Peter Frauenglass
I was making the second claim, or a version of it: what we commonly think of as "rationality" is very limited and seldom used in decision making. We are logical creatures hardly ever, if at all.
If our conscious mind, the part that can use logic and that we usually call "rational," is a cubic foot, then our subconscious is the volume of our whole galaxy. The conscious mind isn't used until a decision is already made. Ever noticed how when you try to think through a problem you get nowhere, but a complete solution will often occur out of nowhere, all at once? That's your subconscious at work.
I'm not trying to say that our subconscious decisions have no reasons behind them - just that the reasons we actually make decisions aren't usually apparent, and are certainly not conscious. Not random, but not rationally arrived at either.
So overall, I agree that we're sometimes rational, but very seldom. Even when we list out the pros and cons of each choice, we usually end up relying on gut instinct.
That's the basic problem with western philosophy in general - it tries so hard to be rational and logical, but all it ends up doing is using the smallest part of the brain for the most difficult problems we're faced with as thinking creatures.
Comment by Nonymous
Philosophy Blog
What is a decision? There may be a temptation to think of a paradigmatic decision as something grand, requiring contemplation, and life-changing. But could a decision (for the purposes of a discussion about what percentage of decisions are rational) also be something very small?
You buy an ice-cream from me for $1. You give me a $2 coin (since we're in Australia), and I give you $1 change. -- Did I make a "decision" to give you $1? And did my decision involve rationality? Was it guided by rationality?
I guess what I'm suggesting is that if decisions can be very small things, then aren't there hundreds (or thousands) of decisions every day -- hundreds of times when a choice is presented to consciousness -- and hundreds of times when one experiences reasoning to a choice, and then going through with that choice?
Just want to mention, for the sake of clarification, that there are two category systems here:
conscious vs subconscious
rational vs irrational
-- and I think you'd probably agree that the conscious can be irrational and the subconscious can be rational. The subconscious can employ logical processes.
I guess I mention this because it seems to add complication to trying to evaluate how rational people and decisions are, given the difficulty of assessing how rational the subconscious is or isn't.
Not sure how far I can go with you here.
It may be true that people's brains are much more subconscious than conscious (one isn't aware of all the things that one's body is doing at any point in time) -- but I don't think it follows that searching for conscious reasons and trying to be logical are necessarily bad things (if this is what you're saying).
Is your concern that one isn't taking full advantage of the power of the brain? If so, then I think that's a fair point.
Creative activities are the obvious example. "Creative" is almost synonymous with "without rules" -- unmethodical, unplanned, spontaneous, free-ranging...
Perhaps chess is another good example. Grandmasters will consciously calculate things, and they will also listen to their intuitions, and make psychological evaluations of their opponent ("He looks like he's planning a trap") -- and, certainly, it contributes to playing good chess to use more than the fully-conscious part of the brain.
So, in many spheres of activity, it does seem to be a good thing to use more than the conscious part of the brain, and to use other than purely-logical processes.
But doesn't the grandmaster still try to use logic as much as possible, and doesn't the artist also use technique, method, craft?
Don't know if you're going this far, but there are many potential dangers to abandoning a search for reasons. When a politician says "I don't have any reasons, but just trust me", I think it's fair to raise a skeptical eyebrow -- and I think the same is true of the philosopher who says, "This is how things are -- just trust me" or "This is what you should do -- just trust me".