Relativism
April 20th 2009 06:26
The relativism I'm thinking about goes:
"The truth or falsity of all moral assertions (apart from this one) is relative to the moral codes of particular groups or persons."
There's lots of other ideas that people associate with "relativism". For instance, there might be claims about moral absolutes (their existence, or compulsion, or the meaningfulness of ascribing truth to them), or there might be claims like "your values are as good as mine", "society must tolerate the values of all ethnic groups", etc.
In contrast, my definition is a narrow one; but I do think it's at least one plank of the normal relativist scaffolding
"The truth or falsity of all moral assertions depends on particular codes..." So what is a "moral assertion"? -- I'm going to understand the phrase in a crude but broad way, as any assertion involving typically moral language.
My method will be to go through four random examples of the word "wrong" and see whether the relativism claim is true.
Example 1: An anthroplogist says, "It is wrong for Hindus to touch cows."
There are those who claim that "wrong" can never be used in a relative way. Well, I think such people are wrong, if example (1) is an intelligible, acceptable sentence that doesn't violate any linguistic rules.
What it means "to be relative to" is somewhat mysterious. But clearly the truth or falsity of (1) (which is an empirical, descriptive claim) depends, in a direct way, on a particular moral code and what that code says.
"Depends" is only slightly less mysterious, but I think you can see how it could be better explicated -- perhaps in terms of evidence you're required to examine, perhaps in terms of necessary conditions, and so forth.
To ask what might seem a bizarre question (but it will come up again later): Does the truth value of (1) also depend on the existence of that moral code? What if there were no Hindu ethics in the first place, just as there's no moral code for apple-eaters or people who like walking on the grass?
I personally think the linguistic rules in the case of non-existence aren't cut and dried. Some speakers, convinced by Bertrand Russell's views on a similar matter ("The present king of France is bald"), might respond: "If there is no Hindu moral code, then example (1) is false. It's not wrong for Hindu people to touch cows." Others, swayed by Peter Strawson's reply to Russell, might shy away from "false" and instead say: "You're mistaken. There isn't a moral code, but you have in mind that there is. There is a failure of reference, and it is misleading to talk about true and false in the way you are."
Example 2: A Christian says to a vegetarian Buddhist, "It's wrong for you to eat meat, but it's not wrong for me."
I take it that example (2) is close to (1). The sentence is immediately understood, there aren't any linguistic rules violated, and what the Christian means by "wrong for me" is "wrong in my moral code" -- it's a straightforward empirical claim. (People who think that it's never sensical to say "wrong for me" are wrong.)
The truth or falsity of the entire assertion is relative to, depends on, the respective Christian and Buddhist moral codes, so the relativist thesis holds here also.
Example 3: "It is wrong for everyone to steal."
This is where things get messy. There's a number of possible usages and interpretations. For instance:
-- the sentence could be understood as non-descriptive, "non-cognitive": it could function as a command or an encouragement ("Don't steal!"), or it could be equivalent to an emotional outburst ("Stealing -- boo; not stealing -- yay");
-- the sentence could be "cognitive", descriptive, as examples (1) and (2) are;
-- the sentence could be some ambiguous mixture of cognitive and non-cognitive (are they mutually exclusive? why do philosophers assume that moral language is either the sort of thing that be true or the sort of thing that can't be?).
But let's assume that you read (3) as a purely descriptive claim, in the same way in which I've read (1) and (2). Even read in this way, there's variants.
-- (A) There is a "distributive" reading. In the earlier examples, there was a specified moral code you were asked to look at, and you simply searched within that code for the relevant prohibition. Well, it's possible that (3) is asking you to look at every moral code, and to search within each of them for a prohibition against stealing.
On this interpretation, the relativist thesis as I've stated it still holds, because the truth or falsity of (3) depends on what the moral codes of particular groups or persons say.
-- (B) But perhaps (3) isn't asking you to look at every moral code. Perhaps it's directing you to look at a single moral code that is set up for everyone.
I think this is a legitimate usage of the words; you can use the words to mean this without violating any linguistic rules.
On this reading, there are immediate problems about where to find such a code, where the authority of any suggested code comes from, and how to interpret what you find.
There are a variety of familiar positions that could arise. For instance, you might be a moral objectivist or realist of some kind (a divine command theorist, a believer in queer moral objects, a Kantian, a Levinasian...). Such a person might further be able to identify a universal moral code, examine it, and discover that it's true that it's wrong to steal. Or you could be an "error theorist", and think there is no such code, and that a version of Russell's description theory applies, and therefore that it's false that it's wrong to steal.
On any of these positions, the relativist claim as I've stated it doesn't hold, because the inquirer doesn't care about what Christians or Buddhists or any particular group believes. The truth or falsity of (3) doesn't depend (at least not in an obvious way) on the moral code of a particular group or persons (unless you interpret the group "everyone" as a "particular group"). Rather it depends on the existence or non-existence of a moral code that has force for everyone and on what that moral code, if it exists, says.
This is enough to prove the relativist thesis false, since the claim was that the truth value of all moral assertions is relative to particular groups or persons, but (3)(b) is a usage where this is apparently not the case.
One more thought.
Example 4: "It is wrong to steal."
When used roughly equivalently to (3), there's still several small differences of meaning. For instance, it's possible that "wrong for" has an idiomatic usage such that it's often understood to direct you towards particular moral codes, whereas "wrong" without the "for" is more readily understood in a non-cognitive way.
But there's an obvious difference in the ways (3) and (4) can be used: -- "wrong for everyone" on the face of it is a more limited expression -- let's say it's "bounded" -- it introduces a limited range -- whereas "wrong" by itself in a sense leaves range unspecified, or at least seems to.
At this point the notion of "hidden indexical" might be handy. Hilary Putnam imagines the situation where there's planet, a Twin Earth, which contains a substance that falls from the clouds, fills rivers, is drinkable, etc -- but it has the chemical structure XYZ, not H2O. On learning of its different structure, would we call it "water"?
Putnam tries to draw on linguistic intuitions, and claims that we wouldn't call XYZ "water", because what we mean by water is "the sort of stuff round here". There is a hidden indexical in our usage of "water", a hidden clause that indicates "round here". And in support of the notion, there seem to be plenty of other instances where we mean more than we make explicit, perhaps more than we're even conscious of. If you claim "The price of a dozen eggs is $1.50" you probably mean the price of eggs round here; you didn't specify location, but you're not talking about the price of eggs overseas or on Mars or 100 years ago.
I'm personally not convinced by Putnam's claim, because, among other things, I think that it's vague rather than simply non-explicit whether XYZ falls within our concept of water. We can't specify all conditions of our concepts. Compare Tim Williamson's remarks -- even if you stipulated that "tall" means "over 6 foot", there's no end to the pedantic questions that could be asked -- should you measure from their scalp, or the top of their hair; if they're slightly taller in the evening than in the morning, are they a tall person, etc, etc -- but the fact is that if all such questions aren't answered, there is still vagueness and the possibility of coming up against situations where it's unclear whether something is tall or not. So if we learnt that the stuff on Twin Earth had the structure XYX, I think that whether we'd still call it water could go either way, and different speakers might behave differently. After all, what was initially called "jade" was later found to be two different substances, yet instead of calling one type "fake jade" the linguistic community was happy to live and let live.
I don't agree with Putnam's particular case, but stealing the idea of hidden indexicals, perhaps you could extend them from natural kinds like water to moral language, and claim that there's almost always a range for the word "wrong" -- so things are rarely wrong full stop, but usually wrong for someone, and there is no right or wrong in an empty universe. Compare words like "scary" or "delightful" -- you might not be explicit about range when you use the words, but it would be strange to talk about these things without conscious beings being involved.
(But what's a hidden qualification, and what's simply vague? There might be numberless other hidden qualifications. And, as I've suggested elsewhere, there might be situations where moral concepts break down or are inapplicable.)
If there are these hidden indexicals, these qualifications expressive of range, the implication is that many (but not all) ordinary moral expressions are relative like examples (1) and (2) -- it's just people mightn't realize this; they're misled by the apparently absolute grammatical form. The range might be a particular group, or might be everyone; context will probably make it obvious what you mean.
Notes
-- On whether a moral usage could be both cognitive and non-cognitive, David Macarthur mentioned at a conference in 2007 that Wittgenstein was sympathetic to this view.
"The truth or falsity of all moral assertions (apart from this one) is relative to the moral codes of particular groups or persons."
There's lots of other ideas that people associate with "relativism". For instance, there might be claims about moral absolutes (their existence, or compulsion, or the meaningfulness of ascribing truth to them), or there might be claims like "your values are as good as mine", "society must tolerate the values of all ethnic groups", etc.
In contrast, my definition is a narrow one; but I do think it's at least one plank of the normal relativist scaffolding
***
"The truth or falsity of all moral assertions depends on particular codes..." So what is a "moral assertion"? -- I'm going to understand the phrase in a crude but broad way, as any assertion involving typically moral language.
My method will be to go through four random examples of the word "wrong" and see whether the relativism claim is true.
***
Example 1: An anthroplogist says, "It is wrong for Hindus to touch cows."
There are those who claim that "wrong" can never be used in a relative way. Well, I think such people are wrong, if example (1) is an intelligible, acceptable sentence that doesn't violate any linguistic rules.
What it means "to be relative to" is somewhat mysterious. But clearly the truth or falsity of (1) (which is an empirical, descriptive claim) depends, in a direct way, on a particular moral code and what that code says.
"Depends" is only slightly less mysterious, but I think you can see how it could be better explicated -- perhaps in terms of evidence you're required to examine, perhaps in terms of necessary conditions, and so forth.
To ask what might seem a bizarre question (but it will come up again later): Does the truth value of (1) also depend on the existence of that moral code? What if there were no Hindu ethics in the first place, just as there's no moral code for apple-eaters or people who like walking on the grass?
I personally think the linguistic rules in the case of non-existence aren't cut and dried. Some speakers, convinced by Bertrand Russell's views on a similar matter ("The present king of France is bald"), might respond: "If there is no Hindu moral code, then example (1) is false. It's not wrong for Hindu people to touch cows." Others, swayed by Peter Strawson's reply to Russell, might shy away from "false" and instead say: "You're mistaken. There isn't a moral code, but you have in mind that there is. There is a failure of reference, and it is misleading to talk about true and false in the way you are."
***
Example 2: A Christian says to a vegetarian Buddhist, "It's wrong for you to eat meat, but it's not wrong for me."
I take it that example (2) is close to (1). The sentence is immediately understood, there aren't any linguistic rules violated, and what the Christian means by "wrong for me" is "wrong in my moral code" -- it's a straightforward empirical claim. (People who think that it's never sensical to say "wrong for me" are wrong.)
The truth or falsity of the entire assertion is relative to, depends on, the respective Christian and Buddhist moral codes, so the relativist thesis holds here also.
***
Example 3: "It is wrong for everyone to steal."
This is where things get messy. There's a number of possible usages and interpretations. For instance:
-- the sentence could be understood as non-descriptive, "non-cognitive": it could function as a command or an encouragement ("Don't steal!"), or it could be equivalent to an emotional outburst ("Stealing -- boo; not stealing -- yay");
-- the sentence could be "cognitive", descriptive, as examples (1) and (2) are;
-- the sentence could be some ambiguous mixture of cognitive and non-cognitive (are they mutually exclusive? why do philosophers assume that moral language is either the sort of thing that be true or the sort of thing that can't be?).
But let's assume that you read (3) as a purely descriptive claim, in the same way in which I've read (1) and (2). Even read in this way, there's variants.
-- (A) There is a "distributive" reading. In the earlier examples, there was a specified moral code you were asked to look at, and you simply searched within that code for the relevant prohibition. Well, it's possible that (3) is asking you to look at every moral code, and to search within each of them for a prohibition against stealing.
On this interpretation, the relativist thesis as I've stated it still holds, because the truth or falsity of (3) depends on what the moral codes of particular groups or persons say.
-- (B) But perhaps (3) isn't asking you to look at every moral code. Perhaps it's directing you to look at a single moral code that is set up for everyone.
I think this is a legitimate usage of the words; you can use the words to mean this without violating any linguistic rules.
On this reading, there are immediate problems about where to find such a code, where the authority of any suggested code comes from, and how to interpret what you find.
There are a variety of familiar positions that could arise. For instance, you might be a moral objectivist or realist of some kind (a divine command theorist, a believer in queer moral objects, a Kantian, a Levinasian...). Such a person might further be able to identify a universal moral code, examine it, and discover that it's true that it's wrong to steal. Or you could be an "error theorist", and think there is no such code, and that a version of Russell's description theory applies, and therefore that it's false that it's wrong to steal.
On any of these positions, the relativist claim as I've stated it doesn't hold, because the inquirer doesn't care about what Christians or Buddhists or any particular group believes. The truth or falsity of (3) doesn't depend (at least not in an obvious way) on the moral code of a particular group or persons (unless you interpret the group "everyone" as a "particular group"). Rather it depends on the existence or non-existence of a moral code that has force for everyone and on what that moral code, if it exists, says.
This is enough to prove the relativist thesis false, since the claim was that the truth value of all moral assertions is relative to particular groups or persons, but (3)(b) is a usage where this is apparently not the case.
***
One more thought.
Example 4: "It is wrong to steal."
When used roughly equivalently to (3), there's still several small differences of meaning. For instance, it's possible that "wrong for" has an idiomatic usage such that it's often understood to direct you towards particular moral codes, whereas "wrong" without the "for" is more readily understood in a non-cognitive way.
But there's an obvious difference in the ways (3) and (4) can be used: -- "wrong for everyone" on the face of it is a more limited expression -- let's say it's "bounded" -- it introduces a limited range -- whereas "wrong" by itself in a sense leaves range unspecified, or at least seems to.
At this point the notion of "hidden indexical" might be handy. Hilary Putnam imagines the situation where there's planet, a Twin Earth, which contains a substance that falls from the clouds, fills rivers, is drinkable, etc -- but it has the chemical structure XYZ, not H2O. On learning of its different structure, would we call it "water"?
Putnam tries to draw on linguistic intuitions, and claims that we wouldn't call XYZ "water", because what we mean by water is "the sort of stuff round here". There is a hidden indexical in our usage of "water", a hidden clause that indicates "round here". And in support of the notion, there seem to be plenty of other instances where we mean more than we make explicit, perhaps more than we're even conscious of. If you claim "The price of a dozen eggs is $1.50" you probably mean the price of eggs round here; you didn't specify location, but you're not talking about the price of eggs overseas or on Mars or 100 years ago.
I'm personally not convinced by Putnam's claim, because, among other things, I think that it's vague rather than simply non-explicit whether XYZ falls within our concept of water. We can't specify all conditions of our concepts. Compare Tim Williamson's remarks -- even if you stipulated that "tall" means "over 6 foot", there's no end to the pedantic questions that could be asked -- should you measure from their scalp, or the top of their hair; if they're slightly taller in the evening than in the morning, are they a tall person, etc, etc -- but the fact is that if all such questions aren't answered, there is still vagueness and the possibility of coming up against situations where it's unclear whether something is tall or not. So if we learnt that the stuff on Twin Earth had the structure XYX, I think that whether we'd still call it water could go either way, and different speakers might behave differently. After all, what was initially called "jade" was later found to be two different substances, yet instead of calling one type "fake jade" the linguistic community was happy to live and let live.
I don't agree with Putnam's particular case, but stealing the idea of hidden indexicals, perhaps you could extend them from natural kinds like water to moral language, and claim that there's almost always a range for the word "wrong" -- so things are rarely wrong full stop, but usually wrong for someone, and there is no right or wrong in an empty universe. Compare words like "scary" or "delightful" -- you might not be explicit about range when you use the words, but it would be strange to talk about these things without conscious beings being involved.
(But what's a hidden qualification, and what's simply vague? There might be numberless other hidden qualifications. And, as I've suggested elsewhere, there might be situations where moral concepts break down or are inapplicable.)
If there are these hidden indexicals, these qualifications expressive of range, the implication is that many (but not all) ordinary moral expressions are relative like examples (1) and (2) -- it's just people mightn't realize this; they're misled by the apparently absolute grammatical form. The range might be a particular group, or might be everyone; context will probably make it obvious what you mean.
Notes
-- On whether a moral usage could be both cognitive and non-cognitive, David Macarthur mentioned at a conference in 2007 that Wittgenstein was sympathetic to this view.
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