Is death an evil?
December 11th 2006 03:32
Fear of death makes good evolutionary sense. But can the matter be opened up to reason? Can you say, precisely, what's wrong with death? (Or is there anything wrong with it?)
A selection of thoughts on the topic...
Death is where I am not
"[E]very good and evil lie[s] in sensation. However, death is the deprivation of sensation... Death, therefore -- the most dreadful of evils -- is nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present, and whenever death is present, we do not exist. It is nothing either to the living or the dead, since it does not exist for the living, and the dead no longer are."
-- From the "Letter to Menoeceus" in The Essential Epicurus (1993), translated by Eugene O'Connor
From The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, translated by ASL Farquharson (1944):
It's atoms or it's heaven
8.58: "He who fears death fears either total loss of consciousness or a change of consciousness. Now if you should no longer possess consciousness, you will no longer be aware of any evil; alternatively, if you possess an altered consciousness, you will be an altered creature and will not cease from living."
7.32: "On Death: either dispersal, if we are composed of atoms; or if we are a living unity, either extinction or a change of abode."
Things are only good or evil insofar as they affect the whole
12.23 "... Now what tends to the advantage of the Whole is ever altogether lovely and in season; therefore for each individual the cessation of his life is no evil, for it is no dishonour to him, being neither of his choosing nor without relation to the common good: rather it is good, because it is in due season for the Whole, benefiting it and itself benefited by it..."
7.23: "Universal Nature out of its whole material, as from wax, models now the figure of a horse, then melting this down uses the material for a tree, next for a man, next for something else. And these, every one, subsist for a very brief while. Yet it is no hardship for a box to be broken up, as it was none for it to be nailed together."
It's natural, and what's natural is good
11.34: "Epictetus used to say that, as you kissed your child, you should say in your heart: 'tomorrow maybe you will die'. 'Those are words of ill omen.' 'No,' he replied, 'nothing that means an act of Nature is of evil omen, or it would be a bad omen to say that the corn has been reaped.'"
Life ain't so great
7.35: "'Do you really imagine that an intelligence endowed with greatness of heart and a vision of all time and all reality thinks this mortal life to be a great thing?' 'Impossible', was his answer. 'Then such a man as that will consider even death not a thing to be dreaded, will he not?' 'Most assuredly.'"
Just worry about duty: death is irrelevant
12.35: "For him whose sole good is what is in due season, who counts it all one to render according to right reason more acts or fewer, and to whom it is no matter whether he beholds the world a longer or a shorter time -- for him even death has lost its terrors."
Peter Singer in Practical Ethics starts off with the idea that ethics is all about violation of experience-related interests ("preference utilitarianism"). And a few chapters in, he discusses what's wrong with killing.
Now, Singer is sus about talk of rights, and the intrinsic value of life, and the intrinsic value of human life. Rather he wants to divide the morality of death into three main categories: killing persons (entities with rationality and self-consciousness); killing sentient non-persons (like insects); and killing non-sentient non-persons (like plants).
As to killing persons, what's wrong with it boils down to: (a) the suffering it causes other people (seeing that the victim is not around to suffer); and (b) the violation of the victim's future-directed interests.
However, there is also the distinction between "act" and "rule" utilitarianism to worry about. Seeing that we're not archangels with perfect powers of reason, and we can't know all the consequences of our actions, it may be desirable to act on the basis of intuitions and generalizations that tend to maximize happiness.
"[T]here are four possible reasons for holding that a person's life has some distinctive value over and above the life of a merely sentient being: the classical utilitarian concern with the effects of the killing on others; the preference utilitarian concern with the frustration of the victim's desires and plans for the future; the argument that the capacity to conceive of oneself as existing over time is a necessary condition of a right to life; and respect for autonomy. Although at the level of critical reasoning a classical utilitarian would accept only the first, indirect, reason, and a preference utilitarian only the first two reasons, at the intuitive level utilitarians of both kinds would probably advocate respect for autonomy too."
Thomas Nagel makes some remarks in Mortal Questions (1979). What's wrong with death, on Nagel's view, seems to turn on a conception of the self as extending beyond body and mind, and beyond life itself. Nagel draws on intuition-based arguments to support this.
One might be skeptical of intuition-based arguments in general, and of whether this particular argument proves anything, but here's an extended extract anyway...
"If death is the unequivocal and permanent end of our existence, the question arises whether it is a bad thing to die."
"I shall use the word 'death' and its cognates... to mean permanent death... The question should be of interest even to those who believe in some form of immortality, for one's attitude toward immortality must depend in part on one's attitude toward death."
"I shall not discuss the value that one person's life or death may have for others... but only the value it has for the person who is its subject."
"[T]he value of life and its contents does not attach to mere organic survival: almost everyone would be indifferent (other things equal) between immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without reawakening."
"it is the loss of life, rather than the state of being dead, or nonexistent, or unconscious, that is objectionable... [M]ost of us would not regard the temporary suspension of life, even for substantial intervals, as in itself a misfortune. If it ever happens that people can be frozen without reduction of the conscious lifespan, it will be inappropriate to pity those who are temporarily out of circulation. Second, none of us existed before we were born (or conceived), but few regard that as a misfortune."
"If we are to make sense of the view that to die is bad, it must be on the ground that life is a good and death is the corresponding deprivation or loss... Essentially, there are three types of problems. First, doubt may be raised whether anything can be bad for a man without being positively unpleasant to him: specifically, it may be doubted that there are any evils which... do not depend on someone's minding that deprivation. Second, there are special difficulties, in the case of death, about how the supposed misfortune is to be assigned to a subject at all. There is doubt both as to who its subject is, and as to when he undergoes it. So long as a person exists, he has not yet died, and once he has died, he no longer exists... The third type of difficulty concerns the assymetry, mentioned above, between our attitudes to posthumous and prenatal nonexistence. How can the former be bad if the latter is not?"
"The first type of objection is expressed in general form by the common remark that what you don't know can't hurt you. It means that even if a man is betrayed by his friends, ridiculed behind his back, and despised by people who treat him politely to his face, none of it can be counted as a misfortune for him so long as he does not suffer as a result. It means that a man is not injured if his wishes are ignored by the executor of his will".
"There certainly are goods and evils of a simple kind... which a person possess at a given time simply in virtue of his condition at that time. But this is not true of all the things we regard as good or bad... Often we need to know his history to tell whether something is a misfortune or not... Sometimes his experiential state is relatively unimportant -- as in the case of a man who wastes his life in the cheerful pursuit of a method of communicating with asparagus plants... [T]he natural view is that the discovery of betrayal makes us unhappy because it is bad to be betrayed -- not that betrayal is bad because its discovery makes us unhappy."
"[M]ost good and ill fortune has as its subject a person identified by his history and his possibilities, rather than merely by his categorical state of the moment... Suppose an intelligent person receives a brain injury that reduces him to the mental condition of a contented infant... The intelligent adult who has been reduced to this condition is the subject of the misfortune... though of course he does not mind his condition -- there is some doubt, in fact, whether he can be said to exist any longer... If, instead of concentrating exclusively on the oversized baby before us, we consider the person he was, and the person he could be now, then his reduction to this state and the cancellation of his natural adult development constitute a perfectly intelligible catastrophe."
"A man's life includes much that does not take place within the boundaries of his body and his mind, and what happens to him can include much that does not take place within the boundaries of his life."
"When a man dies we are left with his corpse, and while a corpse can suffer the kind of mishap that may occur to an article of furniture, it is not a suitable object for pity. The man, however, is. He has lost his life, and if he had not died, he would have continued to live it, and to possess whatever good there is in living."
"It is true that both the time before a man's birth and the time after his death are times when he does not exist. But the time after his death is time of which his death deprives him... But we cannot say that the time prior to a man's birth is time in which he would have lived... [H]e could not have been born earlier: anyone born substantially earlier than he was would have been someone else."
"We are left... with the question whether the nonrealization of... possibility is in every case a misfortune... The death of Keats at 24 is generally regarded as tragic; that of Tolstoy at 82 is not... The situation is an ambiguous one. Observed from without, human beings obviously have a natural lifespan and cannot live much longer than a hundred years. A man's sense of his own experience, on the other hand, does not embody this idea of a natural limit. His existence defines for him an essentially open-ended possible future... Viewed in this way, death, no matter how inevitable, is an abrupt cancellation of indefinitely extensive possible goods... If the normal lifespan were a thousand years, death at 80 would be a tragedy. As things are, it may just be a more widespread tragedy."
Images are from the Wikipedia articles Death (personification), Epicurus, and Marcus Aurelius, and Thomas Nagel's website, and a Berkeley website.
A selection of thoughts on the topic...
***
Death is where I am not
"[E]very good and evil lie[s] in sensation. However, death is the deprivation of sensation... Death, therefore -- the most dreadful of evils -- is nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present, and whenever death is present, we do not exist. It is nothing either to the living or the dead, since it does not exist for the living, and the dead no longer are."
-- From the "Letter to Menoeceus" in The Essential Epicurus (1993), translated by Eugene O'Connor
***
From The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, translated by ASL Farquharson (1944):
It's atoms or it's heaven
8.58: "He who fears death fears either total loss of consciousness or a change of consciousness. Now if you should no longer possess consciousness, you will no longer be aware of any evil; alternatively, if you possess an altered consciousness, you will be an altered creature and will not cease from living."
7.32: "On Death: either dispersal, if we are composed of atoms; or if we are a living unity, either extinction or a change of abode."
Things are only good or evil insofar as they affect the whole
12.23 "... Now what tends to the advantage of the Whole is ever altogether lovely and in season; therefore for each individual the cessation of his life is no evil, for it is no dishonour to him, being neither of his choosing nor without relation to the common good: rather it is good, because it is in due season for the Whole, benefiting it and itself benefited by it..."
7.23: "Universal Nature out of its whole material, as from wax, models now the figure of a horse, then melting this down uses the material for a tree, next for a man, next for something else. And these, every one, subsist for a very brief while. Yet it is no hardship for a box to be broken up, as it was none for it to be nailed together."
It's natural, and what's natural is good
11.34: "Epictetus used to say that, as you kissed your child, you should say in your heart: 'tomorrow maybe you will die'. 'Those are words of ill omen.' 'No,' he replied, 'nothing that means an act of Nature is of evil omen, or it would be a bad omen to say that the corn has been reaped.'"
Life ain't so great
7.35: "'Do you really imagine that an intelligence endowed with greatness of heart and a vision of all time and all reality thinks this mortal life to be a great thing?' 'Impossible', was his answer. 'Then such a man as that will consider even death not a thing to be dreaded, will he not?' 'Most assuredly.'"
Just worry about duty: death is irrelevant
12.35: "For him whose sole good is what is in due season, who counts it all one to render according to right reason more acts or fewer, and to whom it is no matter whether he beholds the world a longer or a shorter time -- for him even death has lost its terrors."
***
Peter Singer in Practical Ethics starts off with the idea that ethics is all about violation of experience-related interests ("preference utilitarianism"). And a few chapters in, he discusses what's wrong with killing.
Now, Singer is sus about talk of rights, and the intrinsic value of life, and the intrinsic value of human life. Rather he wants to divide the morality of death into three main categories: killing persons (entities with rationality and self-consciousness); killing sentient non-persons (like insects); and killing non-sentient non-persons (like plants).
As to killing persons, what's wrong with it boils down to: (a) the suffering it causes other people (seeing that the victim is not around to suffer); and (b) the violation of the victim's future-directed interests.
However, there is also the distinction between "act" and "rule" utilitarianism to worry about. Seeing that we're not archangels with perfect powers of reason, and we can't know all the consequences of our actions, it may be desirable to act on the basis of intuitions and generalizations that tend to maximize happiness.
"[T]here are four possible reasons for holding that a person's life has some distinctive value over and above the life of a merely sentient being: the classical utilitarian concern with the effects of the killing on others; the preference utilitarian concern with the frustration of the victim's desires and plans for the future; the argument that the capacity to conceive of oneself as existing over time is a necessary condition of a right to life; and respect for autonomy. Although at the level of critical reasoning a classical utilitarian would accept only the first, indirect, reason, and a preference utilitarian only the first two reasons, at the intuitive level utilitarians of both kinds would probably advocate respect for autonomy too."
***
Thomas Nagel makes some remarks in Mortal Questions (1979). What's wrong with death, on Nagel's view, seems to turn on a conception of the self as extending beyond body and mind, and beyond life itself. Nagel draws on intuition-based arguments to support this.
One might be skeptical of intuition-based arguments in general, and of whether this particular argument proves anything, but here's an extended extract anyway...
"If death is the unequivocal and permanent end of our existence, the question arises whether it is a bad thing to die."
"I shall use the word 'death' and its cognates... to mean permanent death... The question should be of interest even to those who believe in some form of immortality, for one's attitude toward immortality must depend in part on one's attitude toward death."
"I shall not discuss the value that one person's life or death may have for others... but only the value it has for the person who is its subject."
"[T]he value of life and its contents does not attach to mere organic survival: almost everyone would be indifferent (other things equal) between immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without reawakening."
"it is the loss of life, rather than the state of being dead, or nonexistent, or unconscious, that is objectionable... [M]ost of us would not regard the temporary suspension of life, even for substantial intervals, as in itself a misfortune. If it ever happens that people can be frozen without reduction of the conscious lifespan, it will be inappropriate to pity those who are temporarily out of circulation. Second, none of us existed before we were born (or conceived), but few regard that as a misfortune."
"If we are to make sense of the view that to die is bad, it must be on the ground that life is a good and death is the corresponding deprivation or loss... Essentially, there are three types of problems. First, doubt may be raised whether anything can be bad for a man without being positively unpleasant to him: specifically, it may be doubted that there are any evils which... do not depend on someone's minding that deprivation. Second, there are special difficulties, in the case of death, about how the supposed misfortune is to be assigned to a subject at all. There is doubt both as to who its subject is, and as to when he undergoes it. So long as a person exists, he has not yet died, and once he has died, he no longer exists... The third type of difficulty concerns the assymetry, mentioned above, between our attitudes to posthumous and prenatal nonexistence. How can the former be bad if the latter is not?"
"The first type of objection is expressed in general form by the common remark that what you don't know can't hurt you. It means that even if a man is betrayed by his friends, ridiculed behind his back, and despised by people who treat him politely to his face, none of it can be counted as a misfortune for him so long as he does not suffer as a result. It means that a man is not injured if his wishes are ignored by the executor of his will".
"There certainly are goods and evils of a simple kind... which a person possess at a given time simply in virtue of his condition at that time. But this is not true of all the things we regard as good or bad... Often we need to know his history to tell whether something is a misfortune or not... Sometimes his experiential state is relatively unimportant -- as in the case of a man who wastes his life in the cheerful pursuit of a method of communicating with asparagus plants... [T]he natural view is that the discovery of betrayal makes us unhappy because it is bad to be betrayed -- not that betrayal is bad because its discovery makes us unhappy."
"[M]ost good and ill fortune has as its subject a person identified by his history and his possibilities, rather than merely by his categorical state of the moment... Suppose an intelligent person receives a brain injury that reduces him to the mental condition of a contented infant... The intelligent adult who has been reduced to this condition is the subject of the misfortune... though of course he does not mind his condition -- there is some doubt, in fact, whether he can be said to exist any longer... If, instead of concentrating exclusively on the oversized baby before us, we consider the person he was, and the person he could be now, then his reduction to this state and the cancellation of his natural adult development constitute a perfectly intelligible catastrophe."
"A man's life includes much that does not take place within the boundaries of his body and his mind, and what happens to him can include much that does not take place within the boundaries of his life."
"When a man dies we are left with his corpse, and while a corpse can suffer the kind of mishap that may occur to an article of furniture, it is not a suitable object for pity. The man, however, is. He has lost his life, and if he had not died, he would have continued to live it, and to possess whatever good there is in living."
"It is true that both the time before a man's birth and the time after his death are times when he does not exist. But the time after his death is time of which his death deprives him... But we cannot say that the time prior to a man's birth is time in which he would have lived... [H]e could not have been born earlier: anyone born substantially earlier than he was would have been someone else."
"We are left... with the question whether the nonrealization of... possibility is in every case a misfortune... The death of Keats at 24 is generally regarded as tragic; that of Tolstoy at 82 is not... The situation is an ambiguous one. Observed from without, human beings obviously have a natural lifespan and cannot live much longer than a hundred years. A man's sense of his own experience, on the other hand, does not embody this idea of a natural limit. His existence defines for him an essentially open-ended possible future... Viewed in this way, death, no matter how inevitable, is an abrupt cancellation of indefinitely extensive possible goods... If the normal lifespan were a thousand years, death at 80 would be a tragedy. As things are, it may just be a more widespread tragedy."
***
Images are from the Wikipedia articles Death (personification), Epicurus, and Marcus Aurelius, and Thomas Nagel's website, and a Berkeley website.
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Comment by LaurenD
Great post, Adrian. You're one of the most enjoyable writers in this farmyard!
LaurenD
Comment by katyzzz
Photography Tips
MS Paint Art
This one is, others weren't, this too long, put me down for 1/2.
Do you ever write anything yourself?
katyzzz
Comment by JohnDoe
Film & TV on DVD
Always a pleasure reading your musings.
LaurenD-nice line about Death playing Chess, I have maximum diggage of The Seventh Seal too.
Comment by Little Angry Doll
Falling Haiku Leaf
Inner West Life
This post has certainly given me a pause for thought.
Without getting dark, I rather like Terry Pratchett's Death.
Wikipedia - Discworld Death
Comment by Damo
I think I saw that movie. Very clever LaurenD.
Adrian
As to the question of whether death is evil I have to take a shot at its unwritten assumption. The assumption that death itself should have a moral character.
This very different than asking if killing is evil.
Death is the final result of a series of events, actions or inactions. Asking if death is evil is like asking if floods or droughts are evil. They are event that have traggic results but to call them evil is to blur the definition of evil until it has no meaning.
In short death cannot be good or evil. However how the death came about can.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Katy -- those are good criticisms. And I'd also disagree with JD that what's actually my own writing is well-worded.
I suppose the main thing to say in reply is that I'm not unmindful of these problems -- length and excessive quotation -- and that (believe it or not) I do try to cut down. The constraints that cause difficulty are things like wanting to answer a question in full, to represent people's views efficiently and fairly, and to provide access to primary text (without simply saying: go look in a library).
Looking back over my past twenty posts, NINE of them (ie, almost half) are largely quotations. Looking back over the past 48, 16 are largely quotations (one-third). There are different rationales in each case (and often the post is part of a larger series of thoughts on a subject), but you're right -- a 50% batting average over the short-term just ain't no good.
Comment by Brenton
Dr Spin
Tales From The Other Side
Blip Blog
Gadget Museum
Oh... yes, Pratchett's death is the bomb.
Comment by Bryn
Horrorphile
Comment by MelissaA
Fun Facts
I never would have considered death to be evil to begin with, that is all just a part of the normal life and death process - as we were saying in your other blog, life is the main cause of death.
A very interesting, and lengthy post!
Comment by KylieW
Celebrity Obsession
Death itself isn't evil. It's just a fact. Each of must experience it. However, the nature of the way we make it to our deaths can certainly be evil I think.
Thought-provoking post. Excellent work as always!
KylieW
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Perhaps a rephrase is, "Why do we care about our deaths? What is it that's undesirable about you dying tomorrow?"
Or: "Why do people fear death, and should they?"
Sort of stems from the idea that "death is where I am not". So the ancients seemed to think (or wanted to convince themselves that) there's no loss, because there's no subject to suffer a loss.
Comment by MelissaA
Fun Facts
My biggest concern if I died would be the welfare of my children after I passed away should it happen while they are still young, but I know that they would be well looked after.
I have been accused in the past though of having a bit of a death wish - maybe it was that time I tried Irish beer! ; )
Comment by Lilla
From The Home Front
Enviro Warrior
Dream Herald
Esoteric Bookshop
...I'll just say, that I think it is a necessary evil... if it is(?)
Lilla....
PS Also loved 7th Sign and the one where 'Death' hangs out with Bill and Ted (?) don't quote me Iget all the film names mixed up and I have been to a few orble and non-orble parties lately ... that's two pawns gone in just this week... *lol*
Some good thoughts here Adrian...
Comment by WeR1Family
Stories of Wisdom
Lone - My Life and Thoughts
And it is the law of the universe that energy can't be created nor destroyed, but can only be transformed.
Comment by PokerPro
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Re not fearing your death, and it being counter-intuitive to fear your death... I reckon I can persuade you otherwise.
What if you're in a dangerous situation. You're walking on a tightrope between two tall buildings, you're in a warzone with bullets flying, etc. Any situation where you stare death in your face.
Would you say, for such things, that you would be indifferent to whether you live or die? Would you not worry about dying?
I reckon you're not Stoic enough not to. I might be wrong. I reckon avoidance of death is a strong biological instinct, like avoidance of pain.
The philosophy starts when you try to specify what exactly it is, if anything, that's worth worrying about...
Comment by PokerPro
I think you are right. Yet, I still choose (that is attempt) to not fear my own passing. That is not to say I do not fear a painful death, however.
But, whatever, I am young and without children. I think my notions surrounding 'my passing' will change when and if I have created a child that relies, at least for a while, on me being alive to care for it.
Comment by Anonymous
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
-- you're correct that if people believe in life after death, death isn't so big a deal;
-- and you're correct that if people believe in God, and a few other things (like the benevolence and wisdom of that God), then He/She/It/They might be able to give advice on whether death is a problem;
-- every human being has their own thoughts about whether Santa Claus exists, but they're not all correct. Of course it's up to the individual to decide their attitude to death, but I don't think the matter is so hopelessly subjective that it can't be discussed.
Comment by Anonymous
you know something, i am going to go off topic. I want to talk about the ancients:western thinkers, and their ideas. I want to say is that the ideas they present to the western world are not there ideas. I have read , and researched on something amzing. i have found that these greeat thinkers got their ideas from the religion. such as Bharman,and Budda. Budda himself was a Bharman, thus, i would like to conclude all these great thinkers must have read their work in order to come up with ideas that seem so amzing to the people.
I don;t want to cointinue writing becasue i beleive write in th blog is not easy for me beause when i write i need a lot of time; in order fo my wrting to be undertsood mroe cleraly. I might not be clear here becasue these thoughs are sponteneous, and i did not plan them, they came from somewhere, and i have writen them in this blog. please excuse me for any worng saying.
I did'nt edit my writing, so if you find any mistake, you are free to correct me.
thanks..
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
As I read your comment, you make three main points:
1. You raise the issue of how to define death.
2. You suggest (I think) that this world might not be real, and that the only thing one can be sure of is the existence of the self. (I think the implication is that death might not be real.)
3. You suggest that all the ancient thinkers get their ideas from reading Brahmin writings, and from Buddha.
Well, the first two are tricky issues. Though I don't think they make discussion of death impossible, because any two people who share the same concept of death and who share ideas about what's real will still be able to clearly discuss whether it is a good or a bad thing, and in what ways.
But just to offer some thoughts on these subjects:
1. Definition of death: it's something to do with irrecoverable end of biological functioning. But the main problem with defining it clearly is that "irrecoverable" depends on how advanced your science is, and modern medicine keeps extending the point at which you have to give up...
2. Reality. Now, the idea you seem to be getting at is associated with Descartes. And if you want to doubt external reality, or believe you're in the Matrix, no one can stop you. So it's ultimately an arbitrary choice.
There's lots more than can be said on this matter (for instance, there's the idea that it's simpler to believe in the external world, and that you should always believe what is simplest to believe). But, yeah, basically it's an arbitrary choice. Do you want to act as if things (and death) are real, or do you not?
3. And about Brahmin writings... Frankly, I don't know enough to comment here. I'm fairly sure that Greek thinkers were influenced by Buddhist ideas to some extent. But I don't think this means that they didn't have their own ideas to start with, and I don't think this means it was impossible for them to come up with original thoughts.
When you compare the state of Anglo-American philosophy today with Buddhism, it's not obvious what relation they have, nor how to reconcile them when they apparently contradict. Though a lot of people (for instance, the "comparative philosophy" department at the University of Hawaii) do belive that they're reconcilable.
Comment by Hellvis
Earache Hotel
When I was a small child I was incredibly scared of going to sleep, partly because of the weird nightmares I used to have. But I was also terrified of the concept of sleep, and in hindsight I think this was like a fear of death. I ddin't understand what happened to me as an individual when I went to sleep (still don't) and I think the same can be said for death.
Death to us as individuals is inconceivable. Whether we enter into a new reality, go to heaven or hell, or just cease to exist, all of these states cannot be grasped by the human mind. They are merely abstract ideas that can only be understood by us as conceptualisations based on our current experience. That is pretty scary, but at the same time, is useless worrying about precisely because we cannot concieve it.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Good point about the fear of the unknown. Thanks for adding it.