Was Freud doing science?
August 30th 2006 19:33
Comment from John Fox (La Trobe). No idea how accurate it is; please do e-mail him for more information. Heard on the philosophy radio program.
Freud himself and the first generation of analysts set a lot of store on the claim that what they were doing was scientific.
In 1895 Freud wrote a manifesto for a scientific psychology. People have thought that Freud abandoned the claim, since his later work varied from the manifesto. Fox suggests that, on the contrary, Freud developed a more sophisticated concept of the scientific.
Fox gives this example. The kinetic theory of gases was successful because it managed to explain the gas laws and the laws of thermodynamics. But those laws were not stated in terms of Newton's mechanics (unlike the kinetic theory).
The kinetic theory wouldn't have taken off unless all that earlier work on gas laws and thermodynamics had been done. In other words, there was scientific work that did not assume that everything had to be expressed in terms of the base level science, which at that stage was Newtonian mechanics.
You have to take things as they appear before you know what the underlying physical reality is. And you can still, for instance, formulate laws about the connection between temperature and pressure.
What Freud realized, says Fox, is that before you get to a patently
materialistic science of the mind, you need laws of the mind that use ordinary descriptive terms about desires and thoughts, etc. An autonomous psychology has to be worked out as a preliminary to the hypothesized ultimate materialistic one (regardless of whether or not materialism itself works in the long run). And this would involve dealing with notions like "the unconsciousness".
So there was not an abandonment of science as such, but a different understanding of what needed to be done at that historical juncture.
This talk of embryo science and working out a system of ordinary descriptive terms might be applicable to intelligent design theory and to spiritualism.
In literature, practice runs ahead of theory. You write without knowing all that you've written. The critic limps afterwards to evaluate and explain.
Mightn't intuitions, similarly, run ahead of science?
What I mean is this: intelligent design in its more grandiose formulations is obviously unsustainable. It hasn't proven a god, let alone a Christian god. But the study of intelligence and design in themselves (what they are, when people ascribe them, etc) is non-trivial.
Similarly, should one write off spirits and spiritual stuff on the basis they seem scientifically irreducible?
Is it a mistake to confuse comprehensibility with expressibility? Socrates' victims only ever give him examples of x, never a definition of x-hood -- but does this mean they don't grasp x?
Do we fail to grasp "time"?
This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article Sigmund Freud.
***
Freud in his 50s
In 1895 Freud wrote a manifesto for a scientific psychology. People have thought that Freud abandoned the claim, since his later work varied from the manifesto. Fox suggests that, on the contrary, Freud developed a more sophisticated concept of the scientific.
Fox gives this example. The kinetic theory of gases was successful because it managed to explain the gas laws and the laws of thermodynamics. But those laws were not stated in terms of Newton's mechanics (unlike the kinetic theory).
The kinetic theory wouldn't have taken off unless all that earlier work on gas laws and thermodynamics had been done. In other words, there was scientific work that did not assume that everything had to be expressed in terms of the base level science, which at that stage was Newtonian mechanics.
You have to take things as they appear before you know what the underlying physical reality is. And you can still, for instance, formulate laws about the connection between temperature and pressure.
What Freud realized, says Fox, is that before you get to a patently
Freud in his 70s
So there was not an abandonment of science as such, but a different understanding of what needed to be done at that historical juncture.
***
This talk of embryo science and working out a system of ordinary descriptive terms might be applicable to intelligent design theory and to spiritualism.
In literature, practice runs ahead of theory. You write without knowing all that you've written. The critic limps afterwards to evaluate and explain.
Mightn't intuitions, similarly, run ahead of science?
What I mean is this: intelligent design in its more grandiose formulations is obviously unsustainable. It hasn't proven a god, let alone a Christian god. But the study of intelligence and design in themselves (what they are, when people ascribe them, etc) is non-trivial.
Similarly, should one write off spirits and spiritual stuff on the basis they seem scientifically irreducible?
Is it a mistake to confuse comprehensibility with expressibility? Socrates' victims only ever give him examples of x, never a definition of x-hood -- but does this mean they don't grasp x?
Do we fail to grasp "time"?
***
This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article Sigmund Freud.
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Comment by Justin
Maybe it's a difference between understanding applied theory and terminology but not automtically assuming these methods can be attached to empirical analysis for any kind of deducibile measurement, to which science revolves.
This doesn't immediately make them unscientific, but just by the proscribed notions of evaluating science they are by methodology, unscientific, however not in terms of conduct or theory application but on grounds of repeat testing to provide reducible calculations science can qualitatively dispute over and over but with the same conclusiuons.
...If any of that makes sense.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
In terms of the latter, these things (Freudian psychology, ID theory, spirit-talk; maybe also such things as economics and sociology) are unscientific.
I guess the question that comes to mind is this: I don't particularly want to call spirit-talk science. But what's at stake in including or excluding something from the definition of science? And why does one particularly want to adopt a clear and restrictive definition in the first place?
Comment by nagster
Cenacle
I wouldn't care to comment on the second set of comments but on the first. Freud's system definitely not a science because his entire theory is based on a deliberately undefined concept called cathexis. I personally understand what he means by cathexis but the way he defined it, it won't stand as basis for anything. In the end, he turns out to be as mystical as anyone else.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
I'm utterly ignorant on the subject of cathexis (never actually heard the word until you mentioned it).
What I find striking, though, is that you remark that you yourself understand what cathexis means.
It's of the nature of embryo, proto science to be shifting, murky, unclear. If it's not a science now, do you think that the project must be abandoned completely? Could Freudian theory about the mind be rehabilitated, kicked into shape, and made presentable for empirical methodology
Comment by Justin
Yeah, it's fairly dichotomous in that remark of being theoretical approaches and sciences, though the two mingle and overlap.
As far as sociology and economics as concerned I don't think they are sciences so far as they try to explain what is going on in their particular field, be it rising trends of domestic assault or exchange rates in relation to fuel prices. And thus are deemed social sciences, because there's no one single identifiable way of doing things or reason as to why events occur and what precisely will follow. In a base example there's no x y=xy formula that can be spread across the board for function, reason and outcome in social sciences.
I agree with you here on the false mentality that, "if it doesn't coordinate with science it should be discarded" (esp in psych) because that's wrong. Unless there's one clear, distinctive right and wrong like in medicine or calculus, various approaches shouldn't be thrown out if it cannot be applied to the macro and micro levels of application. They still have much value in both conceptual and lateral forms and could become the basis for further, more broader understandings.
However, science as a discipline is focused necessarily on formula and reliability that can be tested numerous times and still have near identical results. Theoretical approaches cannot afford themselves that luxury as their perimeters (esp with humans) is too complex, intricate and irrededucible at this point. In an analogy the two are like ideas and facts - they both rely on each other but cannot sustain each other individually.
Comment by Justin
Probably to the delight of feminists everywhere!
Comment by Dan
One of the main criticisms to Freud's work that applies to this topic is that of whether his theories were actually scientific.
In the realm of the unconcious and subjectivity, it seems impossible to establish scietific, material truths. Especially in terms of subjectivity, what makes a subject individual if his or her conciousness canbe defined by scientific laws.
I personally find Freud a load of crap. The Oedapal/Elektra complex just doesn't make sense. If it did, the human beings would establish their sexuality at an infant age as opposed to a teenage one.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
-- People don't like to be nailed to a truth. They don't like to be defined, scientifically or otherwise.
But can't an individual still be an individual even when their consciousness is subject to scientific laws?
-- Re development of sexuality... I can't remember Freudian theories very well, and I don't necessarily believe them myself, but anything that happens has a cause and a reason, right? So sexual development also has a cause and a reason?
I'd suggest that this stuff about being attracted to your mother is at least possible. I mean, if you think about what influences you in your early childhood, your parents are the obvious candidates. And your mother is the main female with whom you come in contact.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Two thoughts in reply:
-- Maybe we should junk the word "science" altogether. What do you reckon? Why bother to classify anything as a science at all?
-- "However, science as a discipline is focused necessarily on formula and reliability that can be tested numerous times and still have near identical results. Theoretical approaches cannot afford themselves that luxury as their perimeters (esp with humans) is too complex, intricate and irrededucible at this point."
I guess the main thing this made me think of is whether psychoanalysis really is not open to testing.
My gut feeling is that a lot of it probably can be tested -- to some extent. For instance, Freud makes a lot of claims about childhood development, and aren't these the subject of case study, observational data, sociological data?
Also, at the practical end, the results of psychoanalysis could force a rethink of theory. I mean, if your techniques simply are not effective, wouldn't you think to yourself that there's a hole somewhere.
Comment by Justin
I do get your implication though - that it's meaning implies a staple or institution, that if not adhered to is considered either wrong or unscientific.
Freud didn't really scientifically test his theories but applied them by individual case studies to form a basis for a wider theory. This is all well and good but cannot provide a science that neccessitates results must be near identical for fundamentals and particularities or individual cases. So basically, although correct and useful to one, may not be for others, which science discerns falsifiable or negligible on further enquiry.
So yeah, overall I've been taught to assimilate science's function as not which that can be right, but that which cannot be wrong.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Yep, I wasn't suggesting we junk science in that first point. I was talking about the word "science".
An idea about scientific methodology... Would it be fair to say that case studies are, among other things, a form of argument by induction? So, one case study might not be solid grounds for repeatable results, but what about a million? -- Could case studies used in this sort of way constitute a science?
As to whether the essence of science is about individual and repeatable results... I think this question goes back to how to define science in the first place. I think it could be defined as you suggest, but why couldn't it also be defined more broadly, as Fox suggests, to include theory-mongering like Freud's?
Comment by Justin
I may be wrong in the next part however.
If any induction can be proved to be under the p value, *through testing of the same methodology the first was under, without the inclusion of conditions that weren't your fault or not to the detriment of the findings* whether it be from correlation, quasi experiement or true experiment it will hold to be scientific.
Maybe it (science) should be defined more broadly but I couldn't conceptualise how given it's word has meaning (semiotic) and would have to be junked in favour of something better; and what that better may be, owing to the fact the whole world would turn upside down if done correctly.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
You're quite right that junking the word "science" is a radical suggestion, and wouldn't succeed. But I'm going to start the revolution from this blog entry.
Thanks Justin.