Defining the moral (part 2) -- the difficulties
February 7th 2007 20:29
What distinguishes the moral from the non-moral? I've made three suggestions: (1) that moral claims are normative and not factual -- often they're disguised imperatives; (2) that moral claims aren't practical, but are "unbounded"; and (3) that moral claims are "universalizable", are person- and context-blind.
Well, here's why other positions are arguable.
Firstly, one needn't accept the fact/norm distinction to begin with. After all, when you say "murder is wrong", you speak as if there were a fact of the matter.
The suggestion was that the apparent fact-talk of moral claims can be paraphrased into the normative. "Murder is wrong" really means "You shouldn't commit murder." But perhaps the paraphrase goes the opposite direction, and everything that's "normative" is, on analysis, indistinguishable from the factual. Perhaps all imperatives are disguised conditionals. On this reading, "You should go home" really means something like "It would be better if you went home"; and "it would be better" is a factual, descriptive claim; and it's descriptive of human nature, happiness, flourishing, or the speaker's emotions.
Or maybe you simply shouldn't paraphrase. Maybe nothing "really means" anything else, but everything means exactly what it does mean.
Secondly, assuming that "normative" was meaningful, and that the moral was normative, I wanted to distinguish moral norms from everyday norms -- not murdering from not hammering. But perhaps these differ in degree only, or in dangerousness of consequences, but not in type. Perhaps "Don't murder" does serve a practical purpose -- like promoting human happiness, or keeping you out of hell.
And thirdly, I suggested that "murder is wrong" applies universally and is person- and context-blind. Murder is always wrong, no matter who and where you are, though sometimes there are good excuses.
But there are plenty of systems that we're prepared to call "moral" that aren't person-blind -- that take your caste, gender, normality into account. And there are systems that don't purport to lay down universally operating rules, or that speak in terms of "virtues" instead of rules.
And it's also possible to argue that "murder is wrong" is not context-blind, but is closer to lazy generalization. It superficially looks universal, but that's just because you haven't spelled out the claim properly, you haven't specified all the details.
So, as I said, other positions to my initial one are arguable. And at the moment, I'm thinking: -- At best, the three qualities I listed are aspects of the moral, but are either non-exclusive or allow for considerable vagueness. At worst, they're nonsense.
The truth is, there are deeper problems with the whole project of definition.
For instance, why should there be common denominators in the first place, and not a loose set of "family resemblances"? Does the definition game commit you to a "picture theory" of language? Why should the difference between chair and non-chair be in any way clear-cut? Why should meanings be stable, and not shifting? And what does the task of defining really amount to, given the infinite regress? -- that you can only define a word in terms of other words, and can only define those words in terms of other words, and so on.
If you accept these problems, that doesn't commit you to denying the usefulness of definition, or of dictionaries -- they can still shed light.
It's just that, in that situation, you couldn't presume the light was pure.
Some Hume to finish with -- on the width of the moral (and also, I want to say, on the difficulty of cleanly distinguishing the moral from the non-moral).
His project in An enquiry concerning the principles of morals was to make a list of all the things that people approve and disapprove. In the fourth appendix, he argues that "talents" shouldn't be distinguished from "virtues", and that "social virtues" shouldn't be regarded as virtue proper.
In this he follows "ancient moralists": "We need only peruse the titles of chapters in ARISTOTLE'S Ethics to be convinced, that he ranks courage, temperance, magnificence, magnaminity, modesty, prudence, and a manly openness, among the virtues, as well as justice and friendship."
-- Instead of fact/norm, you might classify the moral as a subset of the factual, and try to treat area of concern as distinctive -- "The moral is that which deals with human nature, happiness, flourishing, behaviour, etc". Well, maybe this sort of definition does work -- I don't know; or maybe it embroils you in vagueness.
-- My three ideas could also have been challenged on the basis that moral claims aren't meaningful to begin with, but are closer to "oops" and "ouch". But I don't take this line; I don't doubt their meaningfulness.
-- You could also ask if the definition adequately accounted for grey areas. Is making a child happy by buying him/her an ice-cream a moral matter? -- I suspect that if you surveyed, you'd find that people would hum and ha, and you'd get a sprinkling of yes, no, and maybe.
-- Regarding the difficulty of distinguishing talent from virtue, Terence Irwin, in his 1999 edition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics writes (at pages 254-5): "Though Aristotle rejects the Socratic belief in the unity and identity of all the virtues, he thinks... each virtue is inseparable from all the other virtues."
-- This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article David Hume. The image of Brad Byers came from this website. The image of AJ Ayer came from this website.
***
Well, here's why other positions are arguable.
Firstly, one needn't accept the fact/norm distinction to begin with. After all, when you say "murder is wrong", you speak as if there were a fact of the matter.
The suggestion was that the apparent fact-talk of moral claims can be paraphrased into the normative. "Murder is wrong" really means "You shouldn't commit murder." But perhaps the paraphrase goes the opposite direction, and everything that's "normative" is, on analysis, indistinguishable from the factual. Perhaps all imperatives are disguised conditionals. On this reading, "You should go home" really means something like "It would be better if you went home"; and "it would be better" is a factual, descriptive claim; and it's descriptive of human nature, happiness, flourishing, or the speaker's emotions.
Or maybe you simply shouldn't paraphrase. Maybe nothing "really means" anything else, but everything means exactly what it does mean.
Brad Byers -- human blockhead
And thirdly, I suggested that "murder is wrong" applies universally and is person- and context-blind. Murder is always wrong, no matter who and where you are, though sometimes there are good excuses.
But there are plenty of systems that we're prepared to call "moral" that aren't person-blind -- that take your caste, gender, normality into account. And there are systems that don't purport to lay down universally operating rules, or that speak in terms of "virtues" instead of rules.
And it's also possible to argue that "murder is wrong" is not context-blind, but is closer to lazy generalization. It superficially looks universal, but that's just because you haven't spelled out the claim properly, you haven't specified all the details.
So, as I said, other positions to my initial one are arguable. And at the moment, I'm thinking: -- At best, the three qualities I listed are aspects of the moral, but are either non-exclusive or allow for considerable vagueness. At worst, they're nonsense.
***
The truth is, there are deeper problems with the whole project of definition.
For instance, why should there be common denominators in the first place, and not a loose set of "family resemblances"? Does the definition game commit you to a "picture theory" of language? Why should the difference between chair and non-chair be in any way clear-cut? Why should meanings be stable, and not shifting? And what does the task of defining really amount to, given the infinite regress? -- that you can only define a word in terms of other words, and can only define those words in terms of other words, and so on.
If you accept these problems, that doesn't commit you to denying the usefulness of definition, or of dictionaries -- they can still shed light.
It's just that, in that situation, you couldn't presume the light was pure.
***
David Hume -- according to Edward Gibbon, the 'fattest of Epicurus's hogs'
His project in An enquiry concerning the principles of morals was to make a list of all the things that people approve and disapprove. In the fourth appendix, he argues that "talents" shouldn't be distinguished from "virtues", and that "social virtues" shouldn't be regarded as virtue proper.
In this he follows "ancient moralists": "We need only peruse the titles of chapters in ARISTOTLE'S Ethics to be convinced, that he ranks courage, temperance, magnificence, magnaminity, modesty, prudence, and a manly openness, among the virtues, as well as justice and friendship."
The discussion is lengthy, but Hume's claims would include:
- Everyday language doesn't cleanly distinguish talent and defect from virtue and vice;
- Everyday sentiment doesn't distinguish the types -- we're ashamed and proud of defects and talents in the same way that we are of social virtues and vices -- in fact, we are more ashamed and more proud of them, and more likely to praise and blame other people on the same bases;
- We praise and blame the involuntary as well as the voluntary; and
- Non-social virtues are closely connected with the social -- like love and marriage, you can't have one without the other.
***
Notes
'statements of value... in so far as they are not scientific... are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply expressions of emotion' -- AJ Ayer
-- My three ideas could also have been challenged on the basis that moral claims aren't meaningful to begin with, but are closer to "oops" and "ouch". But I don't take this line; I don't doubt their meaningfulness.
-- You could also ask if the definition adequately accounted for grey areas. Is making a child happy by buying him/her an ice-cream a moral matter? -- I suspect that if you surveyed, you'd find that people would hum and ha, and you'd get a sprinkling of yes, no, and maybe.
-- Regarding the difficulty of distinguishing talent from virtue, Terence Irwin, in his 1999 edition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics writes (at pages 254-5): "Though Aristotle rejects the Socratic belief in the unity and identity of all the virtues, he thinks... each virtue is inseparable from all the other virtues."
-- This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article David Hume. The image of Brad Byers came from this website. The image of AJ Ayer came from this website.
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Comment by Damo
On the question of morals I have developed a notion that it dependant upon the authority to which you subcribe.
This is why there have been huge splits and fights over what is moral.
The ten commandments have extra weight because they are said to come directly from God.
The eight fold path from Lord Buddha.
Communism from Marx and Lenin
Mao's Little Red Book
Anachist the authority of self
Rationalists the authority of proven facts alone.
Emotionalists the authority of feelings
Some time we quote learned friends or books to give authority to an opinion.
Yet the bottom line is when it comes to morality we choose our masters.
Only when a situation becomes vague or desperate do we seek a clearer understanding of right and wrong.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Recasting your comment in jargon, I think you're correct that moral belief depends on epistemological stance -- on the methods that people think give them grounds for claiming knowledge.
Can there be any conversation between different epistemological approaches? -- Between, for instance, the pure-reason folk, and the people who talk about intuitions and feelings, and the people who talk about gods?
This is an essential but tough question...
I personally think there can be conversation. I think you can have an epistemological rather than moral argument. You can discuss which authority, master is preferable.
But I suspect such a conversation could at best be persuasive -- it couldn't be conclusive.
Comment by Norm
Consumption Malfunction
Equal and Opposite
Arses and Elbows
Footy Power
I mean, a horse is a horse and a horse is not a horse.
Did you ever notice how if a non-American starts killing Americans then they are a murderer. Yet in their own country Americans execute their own legally, rightfully.
Murder might not be right or wrong. Just something you shouldn't do because you might be next?
Your posts I like the best are the ones you penned yourself. Like this one.
Comment by katyzzz
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MS Paint Art
I state, unequivocally that right is not wrong! Q.E.D.
katyzzz
Comment by Norm
Consumption Malfunction
Equal and Opposite
Arses and Elbows
Footy Power
Comment by Cibbuano
Hunt Famous
Orble Post of the Day
Fat Cult
Techbreak
Morals are a function of time, and given enough exposure to something we feel is immoral, we'll slowly be desensitized to it.
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Had a number of reactions to your comment. One train of thought was this: is it possible to do without the words right and wrong entirely? Is it better simply to talk about consequences you do and don't want?
Don't know if you were proposing this idea, but I think I'd be in favour of some version of it.
Though there's still an endless conversation to be had about what consequences exactly we do and don't want.
Dear Katy,
I suppose my post isn't so much about working out what things are right and wrong. It's more to do with, well, the difficulties in defining the word "moral" -- questions about the ways in which the word "moral" are, can, and should be used.
For instance, in a Confucian world-view, everything is moral. There is a proper way, a right and wrong, of doing every little thing. And if you visit Asian countries, you still get a sense of this. A sort of ritual to everyday activities.
Ancient Greeks had a similar idea...
In terms of practical implications... If you find it difficult to define the word "moral", you might conclude that it shouldn't be used at all. Or you might conclude that an examination of morality should be directed to a much wider scope than you'd previously been considering.
Dear Cibby,
Depends what you mean by "universal".
Descriptively, murder is not universally wrong, since some governments murder.
But if you were to believe (for instance, if you were religious) that there was an objectivity to the matter, you could argue that murder is universally wrong in the sense of there being a fact of the matter -- 2 x 2 universally equals 4.
It's probably true that moral feelings -- feelings of right and wrong -- are a function of time. In fact, they're probably a function of evolution.
Don't know, though, whether this means that morals are a function of time. Depends, among other things, on whether you think morals need be tied to feelings.
Comment by Cibbuano
Hunt Famous
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Fat Cult
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Comment by Norm
Consumption Malfunction
Equal and Opposite
Arses and Elbows
Footy Power
Right and wrong are just, dare I say it, opposites.
Action defines the world we find ourselves in.
Words are mere window dressings.
After all, think of good and evil.
Who today that you can think of is committing atrocities hiding behind these two?
So I think that, yes, I advocate the consequences of actions which have a 'good' outcome, rather than concepts?
Or to take no 'action' at all, ala non-violent protest?
Norm.
Comment by Damo
I thought that the purpose of considering any question was to make it clearer, isn't jargonizing it just complicating it further.
Just my thought on that matter. I was taught that if I can't explain the most complexed concepts in my head in a simple and clear manner then I don't know it well enough. Sorry for the digression but my profession is full of jargon designed to confuse the crap out of people. eg:"Homologatious"
Can there be dialogue between people of different moral positions. Sure there can, with out question, common ground can be found. How similar are the 10 Commandments to the Eight Fold Path? Yet there are limits to any dialogue.
ie:Ecumanism is not Gnostism
Points of difference will be found that cannot be resolved between the parties.
Murder is one example.
Is it right or wrong is only half the question.
The other half is what constitute murder?
Is self defense murder?
Is war murder? What about a war of self defense?
Then what constitutes self defense?
The questions are endless.
Yet one question remains static does morality have a time limit? This is a moral question in itself and moral relativism cannot be negotiated with any moral absolutes. Any negotiation make the absolutes into relative in nature.
Comment by DuskDevi
Rugby World Cup 2007
And seeing that I am incapable of expounding anything of a non wow kind...I'll let the venerable literati take it away...
************
(talking pre and post a booze binge)
(a 20th century freethinker, defender of freedom of conscience and civil rights...and a satirist)
(humanitarian, philosopher, logician...and an Earl)
...so basically...fundamentally... morality is in the I of the upholder.
Hope you're well Adrian.
Dusk
giNORMous...you are delicious!
Comment by Lilla
From The Home Front
Enviro Warrior
Dream Herald
Esoteric Bookshop
Isn't murder a matter of conscience alone, regardless of moral judgements of right and wrong?
So, is pure consciousness different to physically programed moral belief?
Now I'm confused...? But I still know that murder is wrong, well unless it's self defense, then what?
What if ... the populace was starving, and killing each other to survive became a way of life? Would we still feel that murder was wrong?
Would the children who grew up in that culture?
Comment by Uula Limanski
Thinking The World
"It's just that, in that situation, you couldn't presume the light was pure."...Anyway, light will never be completely pure...and it's even worst when we have to use language...
Concerning ethics, i think you have to do like in maths: take come stuff as axioms. Well, if you take "universality" as axiom, our case of "you shouldn't kill people" is well proved....i mean, leaving our language problems behind, because otherwise we can't take conclusions at all, and that's not funny...
cheers.
Comment by KylieW
Celebrity Obsession
Wow, excellent post! The problem I find with defining morality is that there are always exceptions to the sweeping statements.
Murder is wrong.....but what if the person you killed was going to kill you? In what instance is it okay to murder someone else??
Though I guess that any argument can be picked apart and fault can be found with it if we try hard enough.
Great work, that was a pleasure to read.
Now that I've worked my brain, I'm going to have to go and surf some inane celebrity sites to rest my mind for a minute!
Kylie
Comment by Damo
Comment by JoshZ
Morality is a tricky subject, especially considering the societal pressures that the person finds themself in, and the pressures that they find within themselves.
I don't think that feelings alone are enough to define morals. I can feel good about smacking someone, but it doesn't mean it was the morally correct thing to do. I can also feel badly about being smacked, but that doesn't mean I didn't deserve it.
Bonhoeffer said some interesting stuff about morality in his book Ethics. He said that in man's choice to decide morals for himself he makes himself into the ultimate authority. He also says, that christians aren't to be concerned with morality........
(leaving that open purposefully)
JZ
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog
Dear Cibby,
Regarding whether the universe is amoral...
William James has a thought experiment like this: imagine that there is only one person in the universe. What then would be "right" or "wrong", good or bad? And he concludes that it is whatever the person desires or doesn't desire, what they have an aversion to and so forth. -- Morals make an entry into the universe with the presence of the first sentient lifeform.
If such an account of "morals" is plausible, then morals don't have to be handed down from on high in order to be morals. Right or wrong could be grounded, for instance, in facts about human nature.
Dear Norm,
It might be one of the cruelties of life that fewer people than one might think hide behind the word "good".
-- It's just that they think they are good, even if they're not.
Dear Damo,
About jargon... Believe it or not, I was actually trying to make things clearer via jargon! But my brand of jargon wasn't just using one incomprehensible word for another, but trying to bring your ideas into a system of classifications I'm familiar with, or suggest to you that this was how they might be understood, because this was how I could most easily understand them.
But you're right to question the attempt.
Forgive me for not addressing the issue of absolutism vs relativism. We must have this discussion one of these days, but I don't know if I can do it justice just yet.
Dear Dusk,
Thanks for the quotes! Cynicism has always been half of philosophy, methinks.
Don't know what the other half is. Maybe cynicism masquerading as realism.
Dear Lilla,
I think it's possible to talk about moral feeings. Feelings that a thing is right or wrong. Conscience I'd regard as a subset of these feelings -- it is those moral feelings that are to do with guilt, regret, and the wrongness of one's own actions.
Now, some people think that moral feelings give them direct access to moral facts about the world. This may well be true; I cannot tell. But personally I'm inclined to try to explain such feelings scientifically. That is, I think that they come from genetics on the one hand (and evolution has had good reasons for installing them), and from society and conditioning on the other. The social side I've commented on in relation to Huck Finn.
Now, you ask whether murder is a matter of conscience alone, and not moral judgments. I'm not sure I understand the question. But I think that matters of conscience are matters of morality, since I think that conscience is a bunch of moral feelings.
You also ask about whether people might feel murder was not wrong under some circumstances. Well, I think they might. I think they might be conditioned to. Or evolution might, for some bizarre reason, instil this feeling into them. Check out this post on how Darwin explains the origins of moral feelings.
But even if they felt that murder was wrong, could they be mistaken about that? Would the feeling that murder was not wrong make murder not wrong? And this is where one has to pose one of the questions I've so far dodged in my reply to you, which is whether morality is just a matter of moral feelings.
Well, that might have to be a question for another time...
Dear Uula,
Lots to say in reply to your comment! But will try to restrain myself.
Firstly, Kant thought you didn't need any axioms, as I understand him. He thought you could pull a moral system out of your arse, out of pure reason! I don't know if I agree, but just thought I'd mention that.
Secondly, one of Hegel's responses to Kant (and this has a common complaint against Kant ever since Hegel) is that the categorical imperative amounts to "empty formalism". It's basically a principle of non-contradiction. But it's as compatible with an evil system as with a good one. It's possible to will "Anyone can murder anyone else if they can get away with it" -- I don't think there's any contradiction there.
But thirdly, I find the axiomatic approach to ethics both interesting and worrying. Because it seems like you can take anything you like as an axiom! And that seems counter-intuitive...
At the moment, I'm toying with the idea that morality can actually be grounded in facts about human nature. This is kind of what I was talking about in my post when I questioned the is/ought fact/norm distinction.
I don't know whether this idea can work, but I'm toying with it...
Dear Kylie,
Thanks for the comment!
I should make this clarification, though... I'm not talking in this post about what things are right and what things are wrong. That might be the second step. But I'm still at the first-step stage of just talking about what the word "moral" means.
I suppose that one of the dreams that some people have is of a morality whose rules have no exceptions -- where, given any situation, it's possible to say either what the right choice is, or that no choice is right.
That might seem very abstract, but people face moral dilemmas every day, right? Every soap opera is full of them. So people do want answers to these sorts of questions...
Dear Josh,
Will have to leave a discussion of the role of feelings in morality to another time... Can't do it justice here.
But I thought that I'd leave you with this old thought: Within Christian ethics, Is something right because God commands it, or does God command it because it's right?
Comment by JoshZ
good question.
LIke you with the feelings, I can't do it justice here, but I will do some thinking.
thanks for these questions and your posts, they help me think.
One day I'll hopefully return the favour.
JZ
Comment by Adrian
Philosophy Blog